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Abstract 
 
The purpose of this major research paper is to examine how existing policies and programs in 
socio-political contexts comparable to Ontario’s make the inclusion of solar energy technology 
with affordable housing possible. The paper begins with the investigation of Ontario’s housing 
and energy systems. Following this assessment is the analysis of existing policy and programs in 
the United Kingdom and California that facilitate the integration of solar energy technology with 
affordable housing. The programs discussed in these regions are compared to past, present and 
future energy efficiency initiatives in Ontario in order to identify which aspects of them can be 
adopted to facilitate the creation of solar-equipped green affordable housing in the province. 
The concluding chapter discusses recommended planning and policy actions to be taken at the 
municipal and provincial level that will incite the creation of solar-equipped green affordable 
housing in Ontario. The paper highlights the environmental, social and economic benefits of 
developing domestic solar energy systems as a decarbonization strategy. Together, these 
benefits act as an endorsement of a potential reality in Ontario in which affordable housing and 
sustainable housing become synonymous concepts in the age of climate change mitigation. 
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Foreword 
 
This Major Research Paper focuses on solar energy systems, affordable housing and the 
relationship that can be created between both to produce environmental, economic and social 
benefits. The paper has enabled me to explore the existence and potential for the existence of my 
area of concentration (“The Integration of Solar Energy with Residential Planning”) in three 
contexts. As a result, I have fostered an in depth understanding of how multiple actors and 
institutions can contribute to regimenting equitable access to cost-intensive decarbonization 
strategies such as solar energy. Additionally, this MRP has enhanced my knowledge of how 
sustainable practices and technology can be used as tools by all levels of government in Canada 
to avoid further situations of socioeconomic stratification in urbanizing regions. Through the 
dual lenses of housing and energy, this paper has allowed me to engage directly with the 
intricacies of urban planning and its general objective of establishing and maintaining equity in 
quality of life. 
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 CHAPTER 1 – Purpose and Methods of Research 
 
1.1: Introduction 
 
As urbanization continues to expand the built form of developed and developing nations, 
it is vital that society explores and implements solutions that mitigate the stress placed on the 
planet as a result of human settlement and consumption. Numerous academic reports and 
studies have laid out the facts that global patterns of human activity have contributed to rising 
sea levels, degraded air quality, increased temperatures and overall destruction of ecosystems 
(Lemmen & Warren, 2004, p. 174; Environmental Commissioner of Ontario, 2014; IPCC, 2013). 
Most, if not all of these activities hinge on the production, transportation and consumption of 
energy in its various forms. Consequently, as David Toke notes, the ‘policy primacy’ of energy 
source extraction and pollution makes it the most important environmental issue of our time 
(2011, p. 38). 
 
Institutions from around the world have acknowledged the reality of climate change, 
largely as a result of the non-renewable energy sector. Many have pledged to implement 
decarbonization plans that stabilize environmental conditions to previous standards while 
maintaining economic equilibrium. Though changes to industrial and commercial practices are 
often emphasized, successfully indoctrinating decarbonization and ‘green’ practices1 requires 
just as much attention to be paid to the construction of and subsequent consumption within 
residential communities. 
 
As the most populous province in Canada, Ontario has a geographic, economic and social 
make-up that is more extensive than many US states and European countries (Winfield et al., 
2010, p. 4116). The province has been praised globally for its 2009 Green Energy and Green 
Economy Act that outlined a commitment to incentivizing decarbonization at various scales. 
With provincial energy usage at 137 terawatt-hours2 (TWh) in 2015 and estimates of 165 TWh by 
2030 (IESO, 2016), smart and efficient action must be taken to ensure energy system security 
without further exponential damage of the environment. The anticipated continued expansion 
of urban agglomerations in the province will place a strain on the ageing energy system in the 
years to come if the province fails to innovate a resilient energy system. Relatedly, as a central 
component of prosperous urban development, the affordable residential built form deserves 
 
1 ‘Green practices’ or ‘greening’ are colloquialisms that refers to action taken to augment human living spaces in a 
way that reduces consumption of natural resources, generates less waste and improves human health. (Foy, 2012, 
p.39)  
2 A terawatt-hour is a unit of power equivalent to one trillion watt-hours. 
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particular attention from institutional actors that are serious about decarbonization. 
 
For many individuals and families, energy costs are a major contributing factor to the 
affordability of housing. Turbulent energy prices in Ontario can result in some households being 
forced to spend more than 10 percent of total income on energy costs, causing them to 
experience energy poverty3 (Cooperative Housing Federation of Canada and the ONPHA, 2010). 
Innovative renewable technologies offer promising alternatives to increasing costs of central 
production and distribution of non-renewable energy. One faction of technology that has been 
innovated largely with residential application in mind is solar energy generation technology. In 
particular, solar thermal heaters and solar photovoltaic panels in their various forms have 
experienced increased application as costs continue to decline and approach grid parity4. 
However, the full environmental, economic and social potential of solar cannot be realized 
without detailed policy and programs in place that incentivize engagement with these 
technologies for anyone striving to live a more sustainable lifestyle in a dwelling regardless of 
their socioeconomic status. 
 
The concept of sustainability or sustainable development has been one informally talked 
about before 1987 (Brown, 1982; Clark and Munn, 1986), but that is when it was distinctly 
defined in the World Commission on Environment’s Brundtland report. The report defined 
sustainable development as “development which meets the needs of current generations without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (UNECE, 1987). The 
definition emphasizes that sustainability encompasses both intra-generational and inter-
generational equity when it comes to quality of life. The latter is often emphasized as a pressing 
issue - as it should be - by politicians and other individuals of influence wishing to leave behind 
a positive legacy for their children. However, it is just as important that among current living 
generations, for development and innovative action to occur that results in ‘just sustainability’. 
This paper seeks to analyze the environmental, social and economic harmonies that result from 
the equitable and sustainable practice of integrating solar technologies into affordable housing 
communities. The treatment of sustainability and affordability as equally important factors in 
decarbonization strategies is what will lead to the standardization of ‘just sustainability’ that is 
necessary for climate change mitigation to stay the course. 
 
 
 
3 Both housing affordability organizations in Ontario and Europe consider households that are forced to spend 10 
percent or more of their income on utility costs as sufferers of energy poverty or fuel poverty (Cooperative 
Housing Federation of Canada and the ONPHA, 2010; DECC, 2012).  
4 Grid parity refers to the point at which alternative sources of energy can produce electricity at a levelized cost 
that is equal to or less than the price of power purchased from an electricity grid. (Breyer, 2013, p.121) 
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1.2: Research Objectives and Methodology 
 
This paper strives to contribute to the academic discussion around the promotion, 
creation and maintenance of green affordable housing in post-industrial regions. Housing just 
under 40 percent of Canada’s population, Ontario is an important context to study what 
conditions are necessary to spur sustainable housing practices since successful initiatives in the 
province will result in environmental, social and economic harmonies that will ideally have 
positive spill-over effects on the rest of the diverse Canadian nation. Additionally, the 
affordability of housing within the province has persisted as an issue due to an absence of 
involvement by senior levels of government in housing policy and procurement. The problem is 
widely understood, and this paper serves to offer an examination of the relationship that must 
exist moving forward between decarbonization strategies and affordable housing in order for 
real progress to be made on housing affordability and climate change mitigation targets. The 
objective of this research paper is to answer the following questions: 
 
How do existing housing and energy policies in socio-political contexts comparable to 
Ontario’s allow or negate the inclusion of solar energy with affordable housing? 
 
What elements of the existing energy and housing system must be remediated to make 
solar-equipped green affordable housing a reality in Ontario? 
 
Both questions are directly related to the concept of green affordable housing within the context 
of Ontario and emphasize engagement with solar technology in particular which has shown 
great potential for increased residential application. To answer these questions, this paper will 
examine existing programs and policy initiatives that actively encourage the use of solar energy 
systems in the development of green affordable housing and relate them back to the Ontario 
context in order to highlight the potential for policy transfer. The seven chapters of this work 
will use literature review, comparative analysis and cartographic illustration to reveal answers to 
both research questions. 
 
Existing policy in Ontario will act as anchoring information for this paper. Therefore, a 
thorough review of provincial housing and energy policy and related academic works will be 
completed. Additionally, in order to gauge the potential for policy -transfer this work will 
examine policy, programs and planning initiatives that actively encourage green affordable 
housing and the integration of solar energy systems with housing in two case study regions: the 
state of California and the United Kingdom. The case study regions were selected because of the 
socio-political similarities they share with Ontario. 
Climate change mitigation is one of the most important socio-political issues of our time. 
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Western nations with distinguished histories of ecologically-damaging industrialization 
processes that are partially liable for climate change have a heightened responsibility to 
influence environmentally-conscious societal outlooks and practices through policy. Both case 
study regions share this western identity and have comparable political systems and policy 
approaches to those that exist in Ontario and Canada at large. As “developed” regions, 
exploration of policy and programs in California and the UK will provide insight relevant and 
transferable to the Ontario context. In addition to this shared identity, California, the United 
Kingdom and Ontario all have regionally specific renewable energy generation targets that 
identify solar technology as an important part of their future regional energy strategies. 
 
In addition to a review of existing policy and literature, cartographic illustration and 
analysis methods will be used. Focusing on the city of Toronto and its major social housing 
provider, maps illustrating the various characteristics of the existing Toronto Community 
Housing Corporation (TCHC) housing stock and the location of existing residential solar will be 
used to analyze the potential for the development of ‘economies of scale’ that would serve to 
benefit from policy and programs highlighted in the case study segments. Toronto was selected 
as the site for cartographic analysis of the potential to increase residential solar integration since 
it is a major urban center in Ontario with well documented housing affordability and 
sustainability issues. Together, these methods will offer important insight into the policy 
responses that can assist in making green affordable housing a reality in Ontario. 
 
 
1.3: Analytical Framework 
 
The analytical framework guiding this paper is composed of two complementary theories: 
ecological modernization and environmental justice theory. Both further an argument for the 
progression of environmentalism alongside urbanism. The former argues for this progression on 
the basis of increased economic benefits while the latter emphasizes the societal advantages to 
fairly disseminating environmentally-conscious initiatives. 
 
The Ecological Modernization Perspective 
 
Ecological modernization (EM) is often linked to the 1980’s ‘Berlin school’ of 
environmental research which proposed that ambitious environmental targets will lead to 
greater economic competitiveness and technological innovation (Szarka, 2012, p. 88). 
Accelerated by political recognition of strained planetary health toward the end of the 20th 
century, the theory grew out of the school’s concern for the decoupling of environmental 
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degradation and economic growth. The EM perspective confronts the mentality that economic 
rationality should always dominate ecological rationality by highlighting that one is not 
subservient to the other, but rather, environmental protection and economic growth are 
mutually reinforcing. Eco-modern strategists contend that an ecological rationality is required 
in order to achieve a certain level of modernization and industrial growth. This rationality 
emphasizes that ecological impacts must be considered as a major part of all cost-benefit 
analysis since the minimization of environmental externalities will increase the efficiency of 
processes of production and consumption (Schelly, 2015, p. 60). As both a social theory and 
political program, ecological modernization is a lens through which environmental policy 
decisions and overall rationality of urban development are analyzed (Schelly, 2015, p. 62; 
Szarka, 2012, p. 88). As is the case with many other analytical theories, there are several 
variations of the ecological modernization perspective that differ in their objectives and 
consequently their view of what constitutes rational policy. 
 
‘Objectivist’, or techno-corporatist EM states that ecological change only occurs if 
conventional industries adapt practices and technologies as a response to social pressures that 
call for the achievement of environmental objectives (Toke, 2011, p. 20). This variation of the 
theory is often referred to as weak EM since it focuses only on the creation of solutions to 
environmental problems by economic, political and scientific elites affiliated with corporatist 
policy-making institutions (Toke, 2011, p. 26). However, the reality remains that society, 
presently, is made up of more than just corporations and consequently ecological modernization 
requires engagement of a broader section of society than just the corporate elite. Contrastingly 
 
‘social constructionist’ or radical EM is a variation of the theory that states environmental policy 
can only be successful in creating sustainable solutions if ‘bottom-up’ patterns of engagement 
are involved (Toke, 2011, p. 20). It is considered radical since it challenges the techno-
corporatist mainstream version of ecological modernization that fails to highlight the 
importance of community level engagement with economically-viable environmental solutions. 
 
‘Identity’ is a middle range ecological modernization perspective that is specific in its 
discussion of renewable energy technology as a catalyst for environmental change. David Toke 
outlines the 5 characteristics that guide this perspective: 
 
1. Non-material or idealistic motives must be clear and accessible in order to gain 
widespread public support for alternatives 
 
2. Financial support for renewable energy sector must come from dedicated financial 
mechanisms in order for various technologies to be deployed in large quantities 
 
3. The renewable energy sector should have independent trade associations that act in the 
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interest of deployment of technology for ecological purposes first and economic purposes 
second 
 
4. The aforementioned trade associations should advocate for the stability and evolution of 
financial mechanisms for renewable energy 
 
5. Deployment of technology is done by independent companies that are not affiliated with 
major utilities. 
 
(2011, p. 39) 
 
 
The perspective calls for the analysis of actions and key actors that facilitate change to sectors 
that resist the integration of renewable energy technology with industries and communities. 
 
Identity EM’s focus on technology deployment is what sets it apart from ‘social-constructionist’ 
 
EM which pays more attention to the formation of social and political organizations than access 
to technology (Toke, 2011, p37). ‘Identity’ EM proposes that public involvement with 
organizations pushing for a grassroots voice in environmental policy is enhanced by public 
engagement with technology such as solar which is used to illustrate a green technological 
identity. Moreover, unlike the ‘objectivist’ perspective, ‘identity’ EM is opposed to conventional 
or existing industry setting the pace for processes of modernization. The process of 
modernization must be driven by public support which is mobilized by an identity that places 
the quality and accessibility of environmental innovation ahead of their cost-effectiveness (Toke, 
2011, p37). 
 
Overall, ‘identity’ ecological modernization emphasizes that sustainability must be a 
guiding force for development; a concept that differs from the mainstream version which uses 
development to guide what the term sustainability means in a given society. By combining the 
 
“technocratic instrumentality” of weak EM and the “deliberative democracy” of strong EM 
 
(Christoff, 1996) identity ecological modernization forms a perspective that emphasizes the role 
of renewable energy in traditionalizing Eco-modern identities. Ideally the perspective envisions 
a society where innovation and integration of green practices and technologies at the domestic 
level leads to the re-configuration of the short-sighted and harmful practices that have 
continuously been validated by economic prosperity. Moreover, identity ecological 
modernization is closely aligned with reflexive modernization, which emphasizes the 
importance of mobilizing independent opinion against existing powers that endorse patterns of 
production and consumption that are unsustainable (Hajer, 1995, p. 282). This mobilization of 
opinion is aided by the integration of renewable energy technology like solar photovoltaics that 
reveal which households subscribe to an eco-modern identity and consequently stand against 
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conventional industries such as coal and natural gas that continue traditions of unsustainable 
consumption. 
 
Solar energy technology is of particular importance to the EM perspective since it is a 
prime example of technology impacting the capitalist production process with products that 
generate a profit and potential for industrial longevity (Schelly, 2015, p. 60). The continued 
integration of solar technology contributes to the fulfilment of an important strategy of 
ecological modernization: embedding ecologically-sensitive technology into the normality of 
consumption by attaching the innovation to an identity that makes it part of consumption 
rituals for as large a portion of the society as possible (Toke, 2011, p. 22). Solar technology 
therefore has the potential to link the eco-identity associated with renewable energy to the 
consumption of housing by people of all socioeconomic classes. 
 
Environmental Justice Theory 
 
The Environmental Justice paradigm evolved out of the New Environmental Paradigm 
(NEP) of the 1960’s (Taylor, 2000). The NEP paradigm was critical of the exploitative positions 
taken during the nineteenth and early twentieth century by businesses and industries who 
rapidly extracted resources with no regard for future needs (Taylor, 2000, p. 529). Unlike the 
Exploitative Capitalist Paradigm, the NEP envisioned a more harmonious relationship between 
nature and humans that stemmed from setting limitations to growth, encouraging widespread 
post-materialist values and avoiding future risks with environmental planning (Taylor, 2000, p. 
532). For example, the NEP advocated for the use of soft technology (i.e. solar) rather than hard 
technology (i.e. nuclear industry) since the former was considered safe technology appropriate 
for decentralization (Taylor, 2000, p. 532). The NEP position represented a new worldview that 
moved away from the Romantic Environmentalist of the early twentieth century, which 
welcomed the preservation of wild lands and acknowledged the reality of resource depletion, but 
could not fathom halting the commercial development of resources in any capacity (Taylor, 
2000, p. 531). 
 
The Environmental Justice paradigm filled a void in the NEP that neglected to examine 
the human-to-human interactions and how they influence human-to-nature relations. In 
addition to dealing with the uneven geographic distribution of environmental degradation, the 
Environmental Justice (EJ) paradigm also addresses the distribution of environmental benefits. 
The paradigm outlines the necessity of responsible use of resources, environmental education 
that intersects with social issues of the present, intergenerational and intra-generational equity, 
self-determination, urban ecological policies and the participation of the public as equal 
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partners in the decision making process (Taylor, 2000, p. 539- 41). All of the characteristics 
combine to form a theory that calls for the alleviation of environmental burdens and the 
equitable distribution of environmental and economic benefits, especially at the scale of the 
neighbourhood and individual dwelling (Foy, 2012, p. 57). By examining both the human-to-
human and human-to-nature relationships through the lens of race, class and gender (Taylor, 
2000, p. 522), EJ theory acknowledges the intersectionality of discrimination, and advocates for 
sustainable solutions that address processes of exclusion. The integration of solar energy 
technology with affordable housing is one such solution that has the potential to allow lower-to-
moderate income households to spend less money on energy and contribute to the 
environmental well-being. 
 
As a service central to the livability of a home, energy is critical to housing since the cost 
of it can be the difference between an affordable and unaffordable dwelling in terms of operating 
costs. In addition to contributing to the unaffordability of housing, high energy costs can have a 
direct correlation to negative health effects of residents, according to a 2002 study titled The 
Cold Facts: The First Annual Report on the Effect of Home Energy Costs on Low Income 
 
American’s by Citizen’s Energy Corporation. In relation to this fact, environmental justice 
theory stresses that green affordable housing is not just about environmental health, but also 
aims to reduce inequalities in human health outcomes that stem from socioeconomic differences 
(Gomez et al., 2011). Consequently, green affordable housing initiatives that improve efficiency 
by their very nature serve to benefit lower income households since they have less resources to 
begin with. These initiatives also take a stand against elite-oriented planning that produces 
spaces of ‘green gentrification’ (Budd et al., 2008, p. 266) made up of luxury solar-powered ‘eco-
homes’ that have initial price tags that are beyond the means of lower-income groups. Creating 
policy and programs that embed ‘just sustainability’ in urban development practices requires the 
analysis of various socio-political and socioeconomic challenges that underlie current Western 
governance systems, and the Environmental Justice theory is a lens that will provide guidance 
for such an analysis. 
 
Though ecological modernization and environmental justice theory are two structurally 
separate frames they can be linked together to form the analytical framework for this paper 
since they engage with similar issues and have overlapping ideologies. Both are well suited for 
the comparative analysis of both case study and Ontario contexts, and together as theories are 
guided by one overarching objective in relation to this paper: the guaranteed growth of 
residential development in urban regions must be shadowed by guaranteed sustainable 
development practices in order for sustainability to be a lived reality for a majority of the 
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population instead of an aloof ideal achieved by the privileged minority. Together the two will 
provide a template for thinking about solar energy technology and the role it should play in 
creating and maintaining greening affordable housing in Ontario. 
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CHAPTER 2 – Ontario’s Affordable Housing Policy 
 
Context 
 
2.1: Introduction 
 
 
Within Ontario, affordable housing is defined as housing that requires its occupants to 
spend no more than 30 percent of their gross income on shelter costs5 (MMAH, 2011). This 
definition outlines the upper limits of the monetary costs of housing, but does not emphasize a 
baseline acceptable quality for the housing. This is important to note since in Ontario a portion 
of the housing stock considered affordable is of degrading and poor quality and has noticeable 
effects on the wellbeing of its occupants. The health impacts of poor housing place people at risk 
and shift a portion of the cost of housing to the health care system (Wu et al., 2007, p. 954). In 
order to prevent future instances of Ontarian dwellings degrading and consequently lowering 
the quality of life of occupants, affordable housing and sustainable housing must become 
synonymous concepts. The Government of Ontario advocates for this evolution of the definition 
since it envisions a future with “improve [d] access to adequate, suitable and affordable housing” 
 
(ONPHA, 2012, p. 11) 
 
Affordable housing serves many purposes and offers numerous social and economic 
benefits. The most basic purpose of affordable housing is to provide a physical link that allows 
occupants to access additional forms of urban infrastructure that ultimately contribute to the 
economic prosperity of a region (Evans, 2007, p. 9). For example, the Board of Trade highlights 
that the existence of quality affordable housing is central to the reputation of a livable and 
competitive city since it influences the interest of potential business investment and is tied to 
services that keep labour and commuting costs low (Evans, 2007, p. 5). Additionally, it also 
fosters better social outcomes for households, the most important being agency and pride in a 
community. Though housing is often seen as a distinct section of the private sphere, it is 
inextricably linked to the quality of life experience not only by those who live in it but those who 
live and commute around it. With a place in both the private and public spheres of society, 
housing can be considered a component of ‘soft infrastructure’ since the quality and availability 
of it has similar impacts on economic and psychological health in the same way roads, sewers, 
schools and hospitals do (Evans, 2007, p. 3; Côté, 2013, p.1). Ultimately, affordable housing is 
extremely important to the evolution of the socioeconomic culture of cities, including those in 
 
5  Shelter costs encompass taxes, insurance, utilities and other payments associated with housing. 
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Ontario. By incorporating solar energy technology - a distinct indicator of an eco-identity - 
affordable housing can continue to inspire the evolution of urban culture in a direction that 
acknowledges the role all households and communities can play in decarbonization strategies. 
This chapter will lay out the history, present realities and future growth of affordable housing 
and the policy related to each period in Ontario in order to provide foundational insight that will 
be referenced throughout the paper. 
 
2.2: Origins and History 
 
 
For a period of time, the Canadian federal government played a large role in the 
provision of public housing programs, but changes throughout the late 20th century slowly 
allowed the senior institution to absolve itself of responsibility for the provision of affordable 
housing6. One of the first changes was the Ontario Housing Corporation Act of 1964 which was 
legislation that established a partnership between federal and provincial levels of government in 
order to improve delivery of affordable housing stock. The act assigned the Ontario Housing 
Corporation (OHC) the majority of responsibility for the provision and management of 
affordable and public housing in the province (Starr & Pacini, 2008, p. 9). Closely related to this 
legislation were amendments to the National Housing Act in 1964 that mandated Canada 
Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC) to provide long-term loans to territories, 
provinces, municipalities and public housing agencies (Rose, 1980, p. 38). The loans were to be 
used to acquire or build social housing units. Together, these legislative changes had positive 
impacts on the amount of affordable housing that was constructed. During the late 1960’s and 
early 1970’s affordable housing starts accounted for approximately 40 to 50 percent of all new 
residential construction (Hulchanski, 1988, p. 13). Outside of new construction, the CMHC also 
provided funds to low-income tenants seeking rental accommodations through the Rent 
Supplement Program and introduced the non-profit housing and co-operative housing 
programs with the intent to disperse low-income populations7. 
 
6 Affordable housing encompasses social housing, co-operative housing and private market housing.  
7 For the purposes of this paper a low-income household is defined based on the spectrum of households that are 
eligible for the Ontario Electricity Support Program. This definition is used since it is relevant to the paired 
discussion of housing and energy in the context of Ontario. For example a household with an income between 
$48,000 and $52,000 with 7 or more people living in a home is considered low income. Additionally, a single 
person household with an income of $28,000 or less is also considered low-income (Ontario Energy Board, 2015). A 
matrix outlining the spectrum of low-income households as they relate to this paper can be found in Appendix A. 
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The introduction of the non-profit housing and co-operative housing programs led to a 
shift in mentality of the federal government who began to encourage a move away from publicly 
owned and operate social housing complexes that had become stigmatized areas of cities 
(Hulchanski, 1988 p. 20). Changing political priorities that sought to address deficits by 
decreasing social support services also influenced the shift in mentality. The new hierarchy of 
priorities became clear when the Mulroney government took power in 1984. The Conservatives 
began to push a neo-liberal agenda that among other changes, created tax breaks for the wealthy 
with the belief that a “trickled-down effect” would occur and support those previously 
dependent on public funds that had been cut (Bunting et al., 2004, p. 365). The federal 
government subsequently transferred the responsibility of funding for social housing to the 
provincial, municipal and private sectors. The federal government continued to focus on 
eliminating deficits into the 1990’s. In 1995 the Conservative Party pushed the Common Sense 
 
Revolution (CSR) which initiated cuts to shelter allowances and welfare rates, terminated the 
construction of 17,000 units of co-op and non-profit housing and downloaded $905 million in 
social housing costs to local authorities (Shapcott, 2001). Paired with the elimination of rent 
control rates, the CSR had noticeable adverse effects on housing affordability and was 
responsible for a rise in homelessness among low-income household in Ontario. For example, in 
Ontario at a median income, an individual could afford a typical one bedroom unit at 29 percent 
of their income in the late 20th century; by 2000 that ratio for the same room rose to 38 
percent, illustrating the erosion of affordability in the province (Suttor, 2007, p. 43). 
 
Following the withdrawal of both senior levels of government, Consolidated Municipal 
Service Mangers became responsible for the development of affordable housing in Ontario 
(Starr and Pacini, 2001, p. 10; ONPHA, 2012). The province’s 47 Service Managers have the 
majority of responsibility for the administration and funding of existing affordable housing, 
however, they are still required to seek ‘ministerial consent’ from the province for changes 
related to social housing properties (MMAH, 2010 p. 11). In an effort to ease the transition a five 
year, $680 million framework called the Affordable Housing Initiative (AHI) was created in 
November of 2001. The initiative was a cost-sharing program between the two senior levels of 
government and the funds were used for the construction of new rental and owner-occupied 
affordable housing (CMHC, 2016). The AHI was active from 2001 to 2011, and during this time 
was the only direct source of federal funding for affordable housing. Over $1.2 billion was 
invested and matched by provinces and territories to create approximately 52,400 units (CMHC, 
2016). In total, Ontario received over $452 million from the initiative, which funded the creation 
of just under 22,000 units. 
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Independent of the AHI, new construction was focused on owner-occupied 
developments in the form of single-family homes and multi-unit condominiums and very few 
purpose-built rental properties were created (Côté, 2013, p. 5; Suttor, 2007, p. 29). 
Condominiums had been popular since the 1970’s when they were legitimized as a variety of 
owner-occupied housing since they were able to immediately generate a cash flow from pre-sale 
to help finance construction (Hulchanski, 2009, p. 7). The financial structure was attractive to 
both investors and municipalities ill-equipped to plan, finance and execute the construction of 
housing at the rate of population growth. The continued dominance of condominium 
development in the densest regions of Ontario has persisted into the 21st century and the 
“trickle-down” effect remains a socio-political myth since existing purpose-built affordable 
housing has been ill-maintained and has exhibited minimal levels of growth. 
 
2.3: Present-day Policies and Realities 
 
 
Housing affordability has continued to erode present day as a result of a lack of new 
rental tenure construction and rising prices (FCM, 2012 p.1). Both of these issues are 
exasperated by the lack of coordination that exists between public and private institutions to 
adequately fill the gap left by gradual federal abandonment of housing funding. However, 
progress was made with the introduction of mandatory Housing and Homelessness Plans which 
each of the 47 Service Managers is responsible for developing (ONPHA, 2012, p. 3). The 10-year 
plans must align with the objectives outlined in the province’s Housing Services Act, which 
emphasizes a role for non-profit housing corporations and the private market in the provision of 
housing that “promotes environmental sustainability and energy conservation” (Housing 
Services Act, 2011). 
 
In addition to these regionally specific Housing and Homelessness Plans, the Long-Term 
Affordable Housing Strategy (LTAHS) is an informational document that has the intention of 
guiding future affordable housing development and maintenance in Ontario. Originally released 
in 2010, the LTAHS is a road map for reconfiguring Ontario’s housing system into one that is 
“people-centered, partnership-based, locally driven and fiscally responsible” (MMAH, 2016, p. 
3). The 2016 update of the strategy emphasizes numerous points made in the early version 
which outlined the urgent need to respond to chronic homelessness and vulnerable low-income 
Ontarians by providing funds for the construction and repair of affordable housing. It also 
discusses the $178 million of dedicated provincial investment in affordable housing over a three 
year period that will go toward housing allowances, construction of supportive housing and the 
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creation of an Innovation, Evidence and Capacity Building Fund (MMAH, 2016, p. 2). Moreover, 
the update advocates of inclusionary zoning legislation that would give all municipalities the 
ability to require private developers to include affordable housing units in their development 
proposals (MMAH, 2016, p. 16). The province is likely to adopt this legislation following a 
consultation period with local councils, affordable housing advocates, developers and the public 
(Monsebraaten, 2016). Finally, one of the ideas discussed that is most relevant is the need to 
drastically improve the coordination of all government systems that interact with and impact 
affordability in order to ensure that Ontarians have the best quality affordable housing and not 
just the bare minimum (MMAH, 2016 p. 5). These strategies show a willingness to coordinate 
the wellbeing of the housing system for the benefit of people, rather than neglecting them for the 
sake of reducing deficits and hoping certain private sector actors will directly or indirectly 
address the issue. 
 
One of the most pressing issues is the high demand for subsidized housing, which has an 
average wait period of four years (Monsebraaten, 2015). Subsidized housing or social housing 
refers to units and complexes owned and operated by municipalities or other community 
organizations (Côté, 2013, p. 5). Ontario has 270,000 social housing units, the majority of which 
were built twenty to fifty years ago and require costly repairs (Tsenkova, 2013, p. 18). In fact, 
over half of the providers of social housing in Ontario are not in a financial position to stay on 
top of major maintenance costs and capital repairs so the properties continue to degrade, 
impacting the health and quality of life of residents and the surrounding community (Tsenkova, 
2013). Every decade the province experiences growth of approximately 60,000 to 80,000 low 
income renters that await access to housing that is deteriorating in quality (The Wellesley 
Institute, 2015, p. 1). Moreover, households that are successfully assigned an affordable unit do 
not always receive a housing allowance even though all low-income tenants are eligible for rent 
supplements (Tsenkova, 2011, p. 9). In fact, only one-third of 560,000 low-income tenant 
households in Ontario receive rent-geared-to-income (RGI) assistance (ONPHA, 2013). RGI 
subsidies are generated from the property tax base and can be worth as much as $500 to $600 
per month per household (The Wellesley Institute, 2015, p. 10). 
 
The absence of assistance drastically impacts low-income households that can be forced 
to spend up to 45 percent of a their gross annual income on housing costs alone while a 
wealthier household only spends 15 percent (Statistics Canada, 2011). Current issues with RGI 
assistance do not end with the under supply of supplements. Many tenants receiving the benefits 
are burdened by having to report changes in their income which can lead to an immediate 
increase in their rent (MMAH, 2010, p. 7). Tying RGI assistance to income in Ontario serves as a 
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poor index on its own since an increase in income does not guarantee that necessities and 
services become more affordable. For example, an individual can get a raise at a time when food 
and transportation costs increase, and reciprocal adjustments are not made to soften the blow of 
increased costs of either for RGI assistance recipients, leaving them paying more for rent while 
also pay more for food and transportation. The LTAHS highlights that this is problematic since 
it makes it difficult for tenants to plan for the future when their rent is raised immediately. The 
strategy recommends the passing of legislation that would require tenants to only declare their 
income once a year so they can use their pay raise as they see fit, rather than be burdened with 
higher rent (MMAH, 2010, p. 7). The proposed legislation would also cut down on 
administration costs that could be reinvested elsewhere in the housing system. 
 
The issue of housing affordability in rural communities in Ontario shares similarities 
with urban regions, however the progress that is made occurs at a much slower rate. Even 
though rural populations are smaller, many low-income families struggle to find housing that is 
both affordable and suitable. The existing stock is degraded in quality and consequently heating 
and utility costs are high and continue to rise (Slaunwhite, 2009, p. 13). In fact, the median cost 
of heating a home in North Bay is over a third higher than heating a home of the same size in 
Toronto (Suttor & Bettencourt-McCarthy, 2015, p. 16). Additionally, the landscape and climate 
of the more isolated communities of Ontario shortens the construction period in which 
affordable units can be built (Slaunwhite, 2009, p. 26; Suttor & Bettencourt-McCarthy, 2015, p. 
11). 
 
Over the years CMHC has compiled information about housing costs that illustrate the 
continued existence of the issue. A 2016 Research Highlight report states that 5.8 percent of 
Ontario’s population is in core housing need8 based on 2011 census data (CMHC, 2016a, p. 1). 
Across the nation, the majority of these households are renters concentrated in urban areas such 
as Toronto, London and Hamilton that make less than $31, 598 (CMHC, 2016a). In March of 
2016, Using CMHC and provincial data, RentSeeker Inc. summarized the average costs of 4 
varieties of rental dwellings in Ontario. As Figure 2.0 shows, of the research municipalities, 
Toronto has the highest average cost to rent ranging from $942 to $1,531. Additionally, based on 
RentSeeker Inc. and CMHC data a household at the top end of the lowest 2011 national income 
quintile that makes $31,598 would spend $13,320 on rent in Toronto, or 42 percent of their 
annual income. This percentage is 12 percent above the upper limits of housing recognized as 
 
8 According to the CMHC a household is considered to be in core housing need if “its housing does not meet one or 
more of the adequacy, suitability or affordability standards and it would have to spend 30 percent or more of its 
before-tax income to access local housing that meets all 3 standards.” (CMHC, 2016a, p.8) 
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affordable in the province. The same hypothetical household could only find affordable housing 
in half of the municipalities listed in figure 2.0, and this number declines for households making 
less. 
 
 
 
MUNICIPALITY STUDIO  1 BEDRM 2 BEDRM  3 BEDRM AVERAGE  
              
BARRIE 728   1006  1167   1299  1,050.00   
   
 
    
 
     
BRANTFORD 627  779  870  952  807.00   
   
 
    
 
     
CORNWALL 564  631  778  799  693.00   
   
 
    
 
     
GREATER 610  771  953  1117  862.75   
SUDBURY              
GUELPH 706   898  1027   1160  947.75   
   
 
    
 
     
HAMILTON 590  749  917  1062  829.50   
   
 
    
 
     
KAWARTHA LAKES 665  816  1031  1193  926.25   
   
 
    
 
     
KINGSTON 679  921  1099  1365  1,016.00   
   
 
    
 
     
KITCHENER 698  830  970  1146  911.00   
   
 
    
 
     
LONDON 609  787  976  1089  865.25   
   
 
    
 
     
OTTAWA 801  972  1176  1365  1,078.50   
   
 
    
 
     
PETERBOROUGH 666  816  959  1169  902.50   
   
 
    
 
     
ST. CATHARINES 643  794  963  1137  884.25   
   
 
         
ST.THOMAS 489  656  794   N/A 646.33   
   
 
    
 
     
STRATFORD 566  702  836  961  766.25   
   
 
    
 
     
THUNDER BAY 603  749  917  1131  850.00   
   
 
    
 
     
TORONTO 942  1110  1301  1531  1,221.00   
   
 
    
 
     
WINDSOR 536  689  824  942  747.75   
   
 
    
 
     
AVERAGE 651.22  815.33  975.44  1,142.24  889.17   
              
               
Source: RentSeeker Inc., 2016 
 
Figure 2.0 – The table summarizes average monthly rent in 18 Ontario municipalities for four 
types of rental units: studio apartments, 1 bedroom, 2 bedrooms and 3 bedrooms. Averages for each 
type, each municipality and the province based on the listed cities are also provided. 
 
Moreover, another CMHC report released in April of 2016 estimated the total amount of 
secondary housing in the nation. Secondary housing refers to dwellings that are not purposefully 
constructed to be used as rental accommodation, such as tenanted condominiums (CMHC, 
2016b, p. 2). They are considered an insecure form of rental housing since at any time they can 
be reverted to owner-occupancy (CMHC, 2016b). According to the report in Ontario, Barrie has 
the highest amount of secondary housing at 74.4 percent of the areas total renter-occupied 
housing; Toronto is composed of 50.8 percent secondary housing. Thus, in addition to being 
unaffordable, half of private market rental dwellings in Ontario cities such as Barrie and 
Toronto are an insecure form of rental housing that can change tenure at any time. 
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Overall, the present day unaffordability of housing in Ontario is the result of both a 
financially and physically patch-worked housing system and a growing need for purpose-built 
affordable units all over the province. Future progress hinges on creating solutions that ensure 
three mutually dependent, but presently conflicting goals are reflected in affordable housing in 
Ontario: economic prosperity, social equity and environmental protection (Evans, 2007). 
 
2.4: Future Housing System Plans and Projected 
Growth 
 
Moving forward, both the federal and provincial governments are outlining achievable 
visions for Ontario’s housing system. In the LTAHS the province of Ontario establishes the 
overarching housing goal of improving access to affordable and suitable housing that allows 
residents to participate in the development of strong communities (MMAH, 2016). The 2016 
federal budget parallels this goal by committing to growing the middle class. In order to achieve 
this growth, the federal government has made plans to invest more than $120 billion over 10 
years in infrastructure all over Canada (Government of Canada, 2016). The first phase of the 
plan will take place over the next two years and will modernize public transit, rehabilitate 
wastewater systems, protect existing infrastructure from the effects of climate change and 
provide affordable housing (Government of Canada, 2016). In particular, $2.3 billion will be 
provided for construction and maintenance of affordable housing over two years beginning in 
2016. In addition to these funds the budget proposes the doubling of federal funding for the 
Investment in Affordable Housing (IAH) initiative. The proposal is contrary to the previous 
Federal plan for funding of affordable housing that is supposed to decline t0 zero by 2033 
(MMAH, 2010, p. 12). If the proposal is carried out it would require all provinces and territories 
to also double their investment in affordable housing since the initiative requires them to match 
federal contributions. 
 
Both senior levels of government acknowledge that achieving these goals will require the 
construction of new dwellings, the maintenance of existing ones, and an increase in the number 
of housing allowances. All of this must be done in the wake of a rising population in Ontario that 
is expected to grow by 4.2 million by 2041 (Ministry of Finance, 2014). The Greater Toronto 
Area (GTA) is projected to be the fastest growing region in the province with populations rising 
from 6.5 million in 2013 to 9.4 million in 2041 (Ministry of Finance, 2014). The province has 
committed to annually provide municipalities access to $1.5 billion in funds for housing by 2018 
(MMAH, 2010, p. 12) and the potential doubling of funding for the IAH could increase these 
funds. Additionally, Ontario is in the final stages of establishing province-wide inclusionary 
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zoning legislation that would allow municipalities to require residential developers to set aside a 
certain portion of units as affordable (MMAH, 2016). Municipalities would have the power to 
regulate what size developments must obey the regulations, if it is citywide, how affordability 
will be determined and the percentage of affordable units required (Monsebraaten, 2016). The 
funding plans made thus far by both the federal and provincial levels of government to support 
the economic development and maintenance of affordable housing are a good start. However, it 
is important that initiatives that address residential sustainability are developed in order for 
affordable housing to contribute to the additional goals of inter-generational and intra-
generational equity and environmental health. 
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CHAPTER 3 – Ontario’s 21st Century Energy 
 
Context 
 
 
3.1: Introduction 
 
 
In the previous century, Ontario’s energy system was structured haphazardly with at one 
point 393 utilities providing power at varying prices to customers (Elston et al., 2012, p. 5). The 
system remained fractured until 1998, at which point the Energy Competition Act (ECA) was 
passed (Elston et al., 2012, p. 5). The ECA mandated the creation of Ontario Power Generation 
(OPG) as an electricity generation company and Hydro One Inc. as the corporation responsible 
for managing transmission and distribution assets previously maintained by Ontario Hydro 
(Rosenbloom and Meadowcroft, 2013, p. 675). The Act also created the Independent Market 
Operator (now known as the Independent Electricity System Operator) which had the sole 
responsibility of managing the competitive market and balancing the province’s electricity 
system. Additionally, the Ontario Energy Board (OEB) was created to regulate the price rates of 
all utilities and oversee the operation of all of the newly created entities. 
 
Staying true to their neo-liberal agenda, the Conservative government initiated the 
wholesale and retail electricity market in the province in May of 2002 (Rosenbloom and 
Meadowcroft, 2013, p. 675). The private electricity market was subsequently dissolved in the fall 
of the same year after a summer heat wave that drove up prices and generated public backlash 
(Simon, 2002; Rosenbloom and Meadowcroft, 2013). In the following two years the Liberal 
provincial government stabilized the system by creating a regulated price plan for low volume 
consumers, keeping the wholesale market for high volume consumers and giving the newly 
created Ontario Power Authority (OPA) the power to plan the electrical system, develop 
conservation programs and procure private generation (Wyman, 2008). The result of all these 
changes is the current hybrid energy system that has both wholesale and regulate price plan 
components to meet the varying needs of energy consumers in Ontario. 
 
This chapter will discuss the evolution of energy generation sources in Ontario, the 
current long-term energy plan for the province and the potential for increased integration of 
solar technology beyond 2016. Together, these concepts will provide foundational knowledge 
about Ontario’s 21st century energy context. 
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3.2: Ontario's Long-term Energy Plan 
 
 
In addition to reassigning various responsibilities of the Ontario energy system, there 
was also a new focus on which sources should generate the majority of power in the latter half of 
the 20th century. The new focused spawned from the reality of how vulnerable fossil fuel 
dependence made the province during the 1973 oil crisis. World oil prices quadrupled between 
October of 1973 and January of 1974 causing many regions to re-evaluate their dependence on 
fossil fuels (Licklider, 1998). During this period nuclear energy generation began to be viewed as 
the preferred source of power in Ontario in the face of rising fossil fuel prices (Rosenbloom and 
Meadowcroft, 2013, p. 674). In fact, as early as 1975 the province made plans for nuclear to meet 
up to 70 percent of the provinces future electricity demand (McKay, 1983). By the 1980's 
Ontario had 16 nuclear power plants located in clusters in Clarington, Pickering and Tiverton 
(Brooks, 2002). Despite the rapid development of nuclear, the public voiced reservations about 
the technology since the construction costs had noticeably increased consumer electricity rates 
(Rosenbloom and Meadowcroft, 2013, p. 675). The increase in rates was also a result of the 
documented reduction in energy consumption growth in Ontario during the 1980s and 1990s 
(Rosenbloom and Meadowcroft, 2013, p. 675). Both these events would eventually cause the 
provincial government to reorient energy policy toward conservation and system efficiency 
principles. The reorientation prefaced the eventual decoupling of energy use from economic 
growth; an ideological foundation from which decarbonization strategies and programs 
sprouted. 
 
Feed-in Tariff Program 
 
Following the passing of the ECA and the brief existence of a province-wide wholesale 
and retail energy market, the Liberal government began to voice support for a campaign 
advocating a Feed-in Tariff (FiT) program. The Ontario Sustainable Energy Association (OSEA) 
initiated the campaign in 2004 to pressure the provincial development of policies that would 
result in the proliferation of affordable renewable energy and the jobs that came with it (OSEA, 
2011). The awareness raised by the campaign about the potential environmental and economic 
benefits of deploying renewable energy technology subsequently influenced the passing of the 
Green Energy Act (GEA) in 2009 (Winfield et al., 2010). Largely modelled on European 
renewable energy legislation, the GEA was the first act in Canada to encourage individual, 
community and company development of renewable energy projects (Weis, 2011). The 
legislation ushered in a new era of energy policy that emphasized the diversification of the 
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province’s energy system to include environmentally sustainable sources that had the potential 
to engage communities and become the foundation of a world-class green industrial sector 
(MaRS, 2010, p. 1). 
 
Among other features, the GEA outlined the establishment of a FiT program with varying 
rates for different renewable sources, the details of the twenty year FiT contract that potential 
developers would have with the OPA, and the obligation that local electrical distribution 
companies (LDCs) had to accept generators of various sizes into their system (Green Energy and 
Green Economy Act, 2009). The FiT program was preceded by the 2006 Renewable Energy 
Standard Offer Program (RESOP). Under the RESOP, sites that generated 1 to 10 kilowatts of 
energy from renewable sources received a fixed rate for 20 years. Owners of solar photovoltaic 
systems for example, were compensated a fixed rate of 42.0 cents per kWh for all energy 
generated that went directly to the grid (Adachi, 2009, p. 4). The program was frozen in May of 
2008 due to transmission issues and the following year the FiT program was launched (OSEA, 
2011). 
 
Similar to the RESOP, the FiT program provides set prices for the production of 
renewable energy and changes the province’s energy network from a one-way to a periodically 
two-way flow of energy (Elston et al., 2012, p. 23). In terms of program structure, the microFiT 
stream is open to entities procuring systems that are 10 kW or less in size while the traditional 
FiT program is for the procurement of systems that range from 10 to 500 kW (Ministry of 
Energy, 2016a). The FiT price rates are designed to help developers cover project costs while 
also providing them a reasonable return on investment over the contract lifetime (MaRS, 2010, 
p. 2). Also, the existence of a provincially-supported renewable procurement program reduces 
risk for investors that develop renewable technology within Ontario’s boundaries since there is a 
guaranteed market as long as the FiT program remains operational. The province’s 2012 review 
of the FiT program revealed that the initiative has attracted more than $27 billion in private-
sector investment and has created more than 20,000 jobs, all while encouraging the public to 
participate in energy generation (Government of Ontario, 2012, p. 2). The program has 
remained popular since its launch and in April of 2016 a directive was issued by the Ministry of 
Energy for a fifth FiT program cycle with a procurement target of 150 megawatts, enough energy 
to power over 25,000 homes (Ministry of Energy 2016b; Government of Ontario, 2013, p. 30). 
The target represents 16 percent of the total capacity that the government has committed to 
making available for the FiT program from 2013 to 2018 (Government of Ontario, 2013, p. 30). 
 
The Long-Term Energy Plan and Clean Technology Innovations 
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The continuation of the FiT program is a central component of Ontario’s long-term 
energy strategy that aims to diversify sources of generation while also advocating a 
 
‘Conservation First’ policy. Known formally as the Long-Term Energy Plan (LTEP), the strategy 
outlines Ontario’s goal of molding a smart electricity system that affords consumers greater 
flexibility when it comes to the production and usage of energy (Government of Ontario 2010, p. 
3). Much of the 2010 rhetoric reappeared in the 2013 update of the LTEP with some 
adjustments made to generation source forecasts. These adjustments increased the flexibility of 
the plan which was necessary in order to avoid the situation of failing to meet specific goals. For 
example, the 2013 LTEP outlines plans to phase in 10,700 MW of wind, solar and bioenergy by 
2021 which is an extension of a time line previously stated in the 2010 LTEP (Government of 
Ontario, 2013, p. 6). 
 
Solar in particular has a target of producing three percent of Ontario’s energy by 2025 
 
(Government of Ontario, 2013, p. 31), but there is potential for this figure and others to change 
as the province approaches the milestone years. To contextualize this proposed increase, figure 
3.0 breaks down generating resources by sources in Ontario as of March 22nd, 2016. In addition 
to energy generation goals, the LTEP established a conservation target of reducing gross 
demand for electricity by 16 percent by the year 2032 (Government of Ontario, 2013, p. 27). The 
provincial government has committed to funding efficiency and retrofit programs, providing 
energy education resources and increasing access to energy data as these initiatives will all 
contribute to the achievement of the province’s conservation target. 
 
 
 Nuclear Gas & Oil 
12,978 MW 9,942 MW 
 36 %   28 % 
Ontario's 
 Hydro  Wind 
 
8,432 MW 3,504 MW 
Energy Supply 
24 % 
 
10 %    
 Biofuel   Solar 
 495 MW 240 MW 
 1 %   1 % 
 
 
 
Source: IESO, 2016 
 
Figure 3.0 – The above graphic details the amount each energy 
source contributes to Ontario’s total energy supply as of March 22nd, 
2016. The majority of power in the province is sourced from nuclear 
energy. 
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In order to track the progress of the goals outlined in the LTEP, the province has 
committed to releasing annual reports outlining changes in supply, demand, costs and 
emissions as they relate to energy use in Ontario. Information from the annual reports will 
impact future updates of the LTEP that occur every 3 years. It is likely that the annual reports 
outlining yearly shifts in the configuration of the energy system will influence how the province 
designates the six percent of ‘planned flexibility’ by 2025 (Government of Ontario, 2013, p. 35). 
Ideally, the continued development of clean technology will impact the configuration as new 
innovations will be evaluated in terms of their applicability to the Ontario energy context. This is 
a likely scenario since Ontario has the fastest growing clean-tech sector in Canada with 36 
percent of the country’s clean-tech companies within its borders (Government of Ontario, 2015, 
p. 14). 
 
One type of technology that has emerged as a potential game-changer for Ontario’s 
electricity system is energy storage. In its various forms, energy storage technology allows for 
the capture and delayed use of energy during periods of high demand. Whether it provides short 
or long-term storage solutions, the technology improves grid reliability. Storage technology also 
improves the practicality of renewable technology such as solar since it enables energy produced 
to be used at times other than peak generation hours (Government of Ontario, 2013, p. 83). 
Recognizing the potential of the innovation, the IESO launched a procurement process for 
storage technology in the fall of 2014 that resulted in the approval of five companies for the 
build-out of 33.54 megawatts of total project capacity (IESO, 2015). This first phase of the 
energy storage procurement program is expected to come online before the end of 2016. IESO 
emphasizes that the projects will “optimize the performance of renewable resources by 
smoothing out natural fluctuations in solar and wind production” (IESO, 2015). Ultimately, the 
optimization of the distribution and transmission network will have widespread benefits for 
system operators, private generators, utilities and consumers in Ontario. 
 
Moreover, energy storage is one component of the broad concept of a smart grid. The 
term smart grid refers to an energy network that is decentralized in form and uses various 
monitoring technologies to generate real-time producer-consumer data that enhance the 
efficiency of the system (Hudson, 2014, p. 84). This concept is counter to Ontario’s present 
‘dumb’ system that is unresponsive to changes in customer needs or grid congestion and mainly 
relies on centralized generating stations (Environmental Commissioner of Ontario, 2014, p. 7). 
The province has welcomed the idea of smart grids with the establishment of the Ontario Smart 
Grid Forum which produces publications that analyze the potential for the future development 
of a smart grid that increases the efficiency of decentralized energy sources and eliminate the 
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possibility of a repeat of the 2003 blackout. The creation of a smart grid will become imperative 
as more decentralized renewable energy comes online and consumer expectations continue to 
change and align with ‘smart’ practices elsewhere in the world. As Ontario moves toward the 
milestone years of 2021 and 2025, the continued innovation of energy system organization and 
technology will play a huge role in how the province redefines the details of the Long-Term 
Energy Plan. 
 
3.3: Ontario’s Energy Reality and Solar  
Opportunities Beyond 2016 
 
 
As Ontario’s moves towards the next decade of the 21st century, a number of temporary 
and permanent changes will play out in the energy sector. One major change is the 
refurbishment of two of the province’s nuclear plants. In Clarington, the Darlington station 
operated by Ontario Power Generation (OPG) is scheduled to shut down four of its six units for a 
refurbishment process that will begin in 2016 and end in 2026 (OPG, 2016). According to the 
OPG, the $12.8 billion project will add 30 years to the life cycle of the station (OPG, 2016). 
Additionally, in Tiverton, the Bruce station operated by Bruce Power Limited Partnership is 
expected to be refurbished in 2020 and will also cost approximately $12 billion (Bruce Power, 
 
2015). Together the two stations account for nearly sixty percent of Ontario’s electricity 
generation when they are operating at optimal capacity (OPG, 2014). The refurbishment 
processes have been rationalized by the operating entities and the province as being necessary in 
order to prevent the social and economic risk of future power outages by maintaining a stable 
source of energy for Ontario’s base load needs (OPG, 2015). Moreover, the OPG has suggested to 
the Ministry of Energy and the IESO that the Pickering station should also be refurbished at 
some point so that it can continue to operate until 2024 instead of going offline in 2020. (OPG, 
2016; Government of Ontario, 2013, p. 5). However, this plan has not yet been approved by the 
Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission. 
 
While the two refurbishment projects take place, the province has stated that natural 
gas will fill the void left by the shutdown of the stations (Government of Ontario, 2013, p. 47). 
Currently, Ontario has roughly 3.5 million natural gas customers that typically use the energy 
source for water and space heating (Government of Ontario, 2013, p. 74). Though natural gas is 
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not nearly as harmful a source as coal9, the planned increased dependence on it is predicted to 
raise greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by millions of tonnes (Weis, 2011, p. 16). In fact, the 
Ontario Power Authority (OPA) predicted that CO2 in the province will increase by 60 percent 
between 2020 and 2025 as a result of increased reliance on natural gas during nuclear 
refurbishment (Environmental Commissioner of Ontario, 2014a, p. 49). Additionally, 30 
percent of Ontario’s natural gas is projected to originate from shale gas extraction processes by 
the year 2020 (ICF International, 2010, p. 7). The extraction process of shale gas involves 
drilling down through hundreds of feet of rocks and then horizontally through shale beds to 
fracture it and release natural gas (Montgomery, 2010). The process has the potential to leak gas 
into aquifers, thus posing a major health risk to communities on the surface that use the water 
(Detrow, 2012). 
 
Unfortunately, the environmental issues associated with natural gas are often 
overshadowed by the theorized economic benefits of the non-renewable energy source. In early 
2016, the overshadowing of environmental considerations by economic ones occurred again 
when the cost of natural gas dropped by nearly 18 percent in Canada (Blatchford, 2016). As a 
result, some providers and consumers have been led to believe that increased dependence on the 
source is economically sustainable during the province’s period of transition. However, the price 
of natural gas has proven in the past to be extremely volatile. One of the best examples of this 
volatility is The California Energy Crisis that caused a 55 percent increase in residential natural 
gas prices in Ontario between February of 2000 and May of 2001 (National Energy Board, 
2011). For Ontarians with the lowest income the increase strained household finances. 
 
Furthermore, temporarily establishing natural gas as a base load energy source may 
prove to be a poor decision in the wake of the Cap and Trade system that is expected to be 
launched in 2017. Under the program the province sets a cap on annual emissions and 
distributes permits to companies that allow them to produce a certain amount of carbon 
emissions (Morrow, 2016). Companies that produce more carbon than what is allowable by their 
permits are required to purchase additional ones from those with a surplus (Morrow, 2016). 
These additional permits can be purchased from companies in Ontario or the two additional 
regions participating in the system: California and Quebec. As a result, it is expected that natural 
gas will pass on some of the costs of purchasing these additional permits to consumers. The 
price per tonne is predicted to be $16 in 2017 and rise to $95 by 2030, which would result in an 
estimated increase of home energy costs of $5.88 to $7.88 each month for Ontario households 
 
9 The U.S Energy Information Administration approximates that for every million British thermal units (Btu) of 
coal used 214 to 228 pounds of CO2 are emitted. Natural gas only emits 117 pounds of CO2 per million Btu. 
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(Morrow, 2016). These additional costs paid by Ontarians will seldom benefit them in any way 
since the bulk of additional permits will likely be bought from California-based companies 
(Morrow, 2016). Therefore, the planned change in the source of our base load energy will result 
in an exodus of Canadian dollars to the U.S. not only to pay for the importation of the 
commodity but also to assist natural gas companies purchasing Cap and Trade permits that will 
rise in cost every year. 
 
In addition to temporarily reducing the supply of nuclear energy, the province will also 
have to update its aging energy infrastructure that for the most part is over 50 years old (Weis, 
2011, p. 3). Both distribution and transmission systems will require extensive updating in order 
to consistently meet Ontario’s energy needs. Transmission systems are responsible for 
transferring high-voltage electric power from generating sites to customer loads or distribution 
systems. Relatedly, distribution systems are composed of the wires, poles, breakers, 
transformers and other related equipment that deliver electricity from a local substation to 
consumers (Weis, 2011, p. 23). Incidents of blackouts and breaker explosions across the 
province are the result of equipment that is not serviced or replaced quickly enough when it 
nears the end of its lifetime (Howlett & Hui, 2010). The lack of maintenance has resulted in 
cities like Toronto having some of the highest-energy system interruptions per customers 
anywhere in the world (City of Toronto, 2007, p. 15). Utilities across the province will need to 
create solutions and initiate actions as soon as possible that reduce instances of blackouts and 
result in the creation of an innovative and sustainable energy system. In order to efficiently 
achieve this future innovative system, the Government of Ontario has advocated amalgamation 
of certain smaller utilities into larger ones to create shoulder-to-shoulder Local Distribution 
Companies (LDCs). Until such a reform occurs Ontario will continue to have more ill-
maintained energy distribution facilities and equipment than is needed to service consumers 
(Elston et al., 2012, p. 14). 
 
In terms of necessary investment, the Conference Board of Canada has predicted that 
Ontario will require $5.48 billion for the transmission system and $16.63 billion for the 
distribution system just to sustain the current network (Baker et al., 2011). In order to expand 
the system to accommodate growth, and create a smart grid that simplifies the process of 
integrating new technologies (i.e. decentralized energy systems and smart cars) the system will 
require additional investment of over $20 billion (Elston et al., 2012, p. 24). When the overhaul 
of the system eventually picks up momentum, it will provide the option for a larger portion of 
the province to meet energy needs with technology capable of decentralized and grid-connected 
energy generation such as solar. 
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The versatility of solar energy generation systems present unique opportunities for 
increased deployment of the technologies as Ontario goes through the planned changes to its 
energy network. One opportunity is the construction of solar energy generation systems with 
content sourced from the province on suitable structures currently serviced by natural gas that 
desire to embrace an eco-identity and keep more Canadian dollars in the province. Solar space 
cooling systems can be of particular use in Ontario during the summer months when the 
province experiences its highest energy use due to hot weather (Environmental Commissioner of 
Ontario, 2014a, p. 58). Furthermore, Ontario has locally based solar manufacturers such as 
Canadian Solar and Samsung that invest billions in communities in Ontario, while natural gas is 
typically purchased from outside the province (Clean Energy Canada, 2015, p. 14). Additionally, 
since the launch of the FiT and micro FiT programs, the average costs for new solar PV systems 
have declined toward grid parity (Government of Ontario, 2013, p. 41). The continued drop in 
price can be accelerated by households and businesses becoming small-scale decentralized 
power plants that will not require the future mandatory purchase of Cap and Trade permits in 
the future. Moreover, solar is an ideal technology for Ontario as the province continues the 
development of a smart grid. LDCs that have already integrated smart grid technologies that 
monitor voltage at points along the network can benefit from solar systems that have similar 
monitoring components to improve the reliability of the broader energy network 
(Environmental Commissioner of Ontario, 2014b, p. 17). Relatedly, a potential shift in energy 
generation preferences may occur in response to the reality of consumers paying for GHG 
emissions under the Cap and Trade program and solar will be a readily available technology. 
 
In order to begin to successfully integrate decentralized energy generating technologies 
such as solar the province must make some headway on both maintaining and innovating the 
transmission and distribution networks. The province has acknowledged that innovation cannot 
occur if the foundational energy system is ill-equipped to maintain its current structure, 
however acknowledgement is not enough and action to refurbish the system while also 
innovating its structure is necessary. The lack of action can be blamed in part on the fractured 
nature of the network with 70 LDCs which service anywhere from one thousand to one million 
customers, that have yet to unite and develop complimentary strategic plans that all have the 
goal of making Ontario’s energy system world-renowned for its efficiencies and clean 
technology. However, there may be hope in the future for the development of such plans since 
the Ontario Government released draft regulations in 2015 that encourage the consolidation of 
LDCs in Peel, York, Barrie, Durham, Halton and Hamilton (Stevens, 2015). Independent of 
these planned changes and ideal scenarios, solar technology will continue to be developed and 
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innovated by both public and private sectors around the world. As the dominant location for 
solar technology in Canada, Ontario must strive to be among the best countries innovating 
efficient solar technology that improves the day-to day quality of life at a local and global scale. 
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CHAPTER 4 – Where Housing Meets Energy 
 
 
4.1: Introduction 
 
Residential energy consumption encompasses power used for space heating, water 
heating, air conditioning, lighting and larger appliances which all impact the quality of life 
experience in a home (National Energy Board, 2013, p. 26). In Canada, housing is responsible 
for the consumption of over 23 percent of all energy use and relatedly, 20 percent of GHG 
emissions (Statistics Canada, 2013). In Ontario, a large portion of affordable housing in both its 
not-for-profit and private forms is older and consequently consumes more energy due to poor 
insulation (Environmental Commissioner of Ontario, 2014, p. 44). In fact, most of the social 
housing towers in the province were constructed in the 1960’s and 1970’s and some can use 25 
percent more energy per square meter than a house (MMAH, 2016). The IESO states that the 
typical household in Ontario uses 800 kWh a month, however energy usage and costs for non-
profit housing and private sector multi-unit buildings that have common areas can be 
significantly higher (Environmental Defence Canada, 2014, p. 2). The increase in cost proves 
cumbersome for low-income households that annually can spend 10 percent of their income on 
energy bills while middle and upper-income Ontarians only spend 3 to 4 percent (Sovacool, 
2013, p. 141; Ontario Energy Board, 2016). In general, the majority of energy used at the site of 
the home is for space and hot water heating (Statistics Canada, 2015). In terms of space heating, 
73 percent of homes in Ontario are heated by forced air furnaces that burn natural gas (Statistics 
Canada, 2015). With natural gas temporarily replacing nuclear energy during the refurbishment 
of the generating plants, it is expected that dependence on it for home energy needs will rise. 
 
As Ontario moves closer toward the target years for emissions reduction and 
conservation goals it will become increasingly important to standardize sustainable 
development practices for a larger portion of the province. One component of the process of 
standardizing sustainable development is ensuring that people of various socioeconomic status 
are able to engage with available energy efficiency technologies in direct relation to their home 
so that emission reduction can take place at the scale of the household. Policies and programs 
that focus on facilitating a link between affordable housing and green technologies contribute to 
this process of standardization by ensuring those with the least means are able to embrace an 
ecologically-modern identity. A public sphere that is heavily influenced by people with 
ecologically-modern identities of various backgrounds has the potential to challenge the political 
orthodoxy of continued dependence on unsustainable resources (Smith, 2003, p. 125). The 
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potential result of this movement is the increased valuation of environmental considerations 
which in turn benefits everyone that calls the Earth home. Therefore, the joint analysis of 
 
Ontario’s affordable housing and energy systems is important since updating the quality of 
interaction between the two has the potential to diffuse this identity among a larger population 
while also creating noticeable environmental, economic and social benefits at a number of 
scales. 
 
The province’s Housing Policy Statement acknowledges that sustainable or green 
affordable housing typically results in fiscal savings and job creation that strength the economy 
(Government of Ontario, n.d.). Studies by a number of institutions confirm the positive 
economic impacts that integrating energy efficient technology with affordable housing can lead 
to. One 2012 report conducted by Deutsche Bank stated that within the US, every one million 
dollars invested in energy efficiency retrofits in multi-unit affordable housing generated 
between $1.3 million and $3.9 million in energy savings and increased gross domestic product 
 
(Deutsche Bank, 2012). Though the United States’ affordable housing context does differs from 
Canada’s, the two share enough similarities that a similar return on investment could be 
achieved in Ontario. Additionally, energy-efficient affordable housing reduces the risk of energy 
poverty among low-income households by lowering utility costs, making them less reliant on 
emergency funds such as the Ontario Electricity Support Program (OESP)10. Furthermore, solar 
energy systems in particular can add value to properties since systems set-up under the 
microFiT or FiT program ensure owners of buildings receive payment for all electricity 
produced, making them a constant source of revenue for the lifetime of the system. Also, the 
efficient operation of solar photovoltaics and solar hot water heaters is highly dependent on the 
integrity of the structure on which they sit. Therefore, integrating solar energy with affordable 
housing can positively influence building owners to perform regular maintenance on their 
properties which chips away at the stigma of rundown affordable housing in Ontario (Côté, 
2013, p. 2). 
 
Along with the economic benefits, green affordable housing inspires positive social change 
in the surrounding community as a result of emphasis being placed on environmental values. In 
order to embedded decarbonization and green practices in all facets of society it is important 
that Ontarians of all socioeconomic backgrounds have the option and ability to engage with 
 
10 The Ontario Electricity Support Program was launched at the beginning of 2016 by the Ontario Energy Board. 
Low-income Ontarians that qualify receive an on-bill credit totalling $30 to $50 a month. Program funds come from 
residential and commercial ratepayers who contribute $1 and $2 to $4 per month respectively. Appendix ‘A’ 
details what households are eligible for the OESP based on the number of members and total income (Ontario 
Energy Board, 2016). 
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them. The integration of solar technology with affordable housing can inspire residents to 
engage with an ecologically-modern or eco-identity as a result of gaining insight about the 
relationship between the environment and energy consumption. The option for low-income 
individuals to engage with such an identity within their communities is important since it 
ensures that “going green” is not a class-exclusive movement. Moreover, regularly maintained 
green affordable housing positively influences residents to take pride in where they live which 
enhances the sense of place of a community. In turn, changing the attitudes of residents in 
social, private market and co-op housing can influence individuals in other regions to hold 
affordable housing in higher esteem, subsequently peeling back the layers of negativity often 
attached to low-income households and their communities. This chapter will summarize policies 
and programs that have facilitated the diffusion of solar energy technology as a decarbonization 
strategy in Ontario’s residential communities. Several of these initiatives will later be compared 
to similar ones in the case study regions of the United Kingdom and California. 
 
4.2: Greening of Residential Building Regulations  
in Ontario 
 
 
Ontario has made considerable headway on incorporating decarbonization standards into 
building regulations. Within the last 20 years, the province has experienced the decoupling of 
growth in building stock from GHG emissions, largely as a result of amendments to the Ontario 
Building Code (OBC) in 1990, 2006 and 2012 (Environmental Commissioner of Ontario, 2014, 
p. 42). The OBC contains regulations that detail uniform construction standards for the 
province. In 1990, under the leadership of the NDP provincial government, the regulations were 
amended to mandate improvements to building envelope requirements and smaller units which 
weakened the correlation between increased residential floor space and GHG emissions 
(Environmental Commissioner of Ontario, 2014, p. 42). In 1995, the Conservative provincial 
government briefly contested energy efficiency requirements in the building code, however 
pressure from a coalition that cited the benefits of the standards halted provincial plans to 
eliminate the requirements indefinitely (Summerhill Group, 2011, p. 58). The OBC was 
amended once again in 2006 by the McGuinty government who set some of the highest energy 
efficiency requirements in North America that came into full effect in 2012 (Summerhill Group, 
2011, p. 58). The 2006 OBC required all new homes to be built 35 percent more efficient than 
those built in 2006 and increased the Energuide rating requirement from 73 to 80 (Summerhill 
Group, 2011, p. 59). The Energuide rating system measures the energy performance of 
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individual dwellings (Natural Resources Canada, 2015). The rating is calculated using software 
that makes assumptions about energy operation in a house based on materials and technology 
present (Natural Resources Canada, 2015). As Figure 4.0 shows a rating of 80 signifies new 
energy-efficient housing that is well insulated, with no major air leaks while housing with a 
rating of 73 only includes some energy efficiency improvements. Ontario was the first province 
in Canada to mandated Energuide 80 levels for all housing built after 2011 (MMAH, 2010). 
 
TYPE OF HOUSING RATING 
  
NEW HOUSE BUILT TO BUILDING CODE STANDARDS 65-72 
  
NEW HOUSE WITH SOME ENERGY EFFICIENCY IMPROVEMENTS 73-79 
  
ENERGY-EFFICIENT NEW HOUSE 80-90 
  
HOUSE REQUIRING LITTLE OR NO PURCHASED ENERGY 91-100 
   
Source: Natural Resources Canada, 2015 
 
Figure 4.0 – The table describes what type of housing qualifies for the 4 intervals of the 
Energuide rating system. A housing rate 100 is well insulated, sufficiently ventilate and 
requires no purchased energy on an annual basis. 
 
From 1990 to 2011, Ontario experienced a 62 percent increase in residential floor space, 
but only an 18 percent increase in related GHG emissions, revealing the effectiveness of uniform 
housing energy efficiency standards (Environmental Commissioner of Ontario, 2014, p. 42). 
Further amendments to the OBC were made in 2012 that established an objective of limiting 
GHG emissions from all buildings as well as limiting peak electricity demands. Both objectives 
will be achieved through the application of a new requirement that will improve energy 
efficiency of residential structures by 15 percent compared to the 2006 code (Environmental 
Commissioner of Ontario, 2014, p. 43). The new requirements will come into effect in 2017, the 
same year that Ontario’s Cap and Trade program is scheduled to be rolled out (Environmental 
Commissioner of Ontario, 2014, p. 43). 
 
In addition to finalized decarbonization standards, the provincial government has voiced 
interested in mandating new standards in anticipation of a growing market for clean energy. As 
a renewable energy technology, solar is capable of generating energy used for electricity, space 
heating and water heating, all of which contribute heavily to month-to-month household costs. 
Solar has gained momentum over the last several decades as a viable mainstream source of 
energy, and consequently the federal and Ontario governments have been assessing the 
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possibility of requiring new houses to be built solar-ready. A solar-ready home refers to 
dwellings that are initially built to include the necessary piping and equipment11 needed to 
install a solar energy system (Ontario Green Homes, 2010). A pilot project developed by Doug 
Tarry Homes in conjunction with Natural Resources Canada is located in St Thomas, Ontario. 
The project has revealed that one of the many advantages of solar ready homes is that including 
the piping for systems at the outset of housing construction is less expensive that adding it in at 
a later time (Ontario Green Home, 2010). The idea of solar ready requirements for housing 
came up with the provincial government prior to the release of the 2012 OBC (City of Edmonton, 
2014, p. 12). Though no concrete standards have resulted from the discussion or pilot project 
findings, it is promising that two levels of government have recognized the role solar has the 
potential to play as a decentralized energy source in a province that has over 20 solar panel 
manufacturing plants within its borders (Clean Energy Canada, 2015, p. 29). 
 
4.3: Existing Energy Efficiency Initiatives in  
Ontario 
 
 
Though additions to provincial legislation called for mandatory energy efficiency 
requirements for newly constructed buildings, over 70 percent of the province’s housing stock 
was built prior to 1990 (Environmental Commissioner of Ontario, 2014a, p. 44). To reprimand 
this issue, over the past several decades the province has made services and funding available 
for residential building owners that wish to retrofit dwelling with energy efficient materials and 
technology. 
 
The FiT and MicroFiT program 
 
Since their unveiling in 2006, the Ontario FiT and microFiT programs have maintained a 
high level of interest despite the gradual reduction of prices paid to generators as renewable 
technology moves closer and closer to grid parity (Environmental Commissioner of Ontario, 
2014c, p. 18). The continued popularity of the program can be attributed to a number of factors, 
including guaranteed payment, a streamlined application process and grid connection priority 
(MaRS, 2015, p. 5). The microFiT program in particular has continued to grow in popularity 
 
 
11 Solar-ready homes include a suitable roof location, labelled conduits from the mechanical room to the attic, 
extra plumbing valves and labels on the hot water tank indicating a point for solar connection. (Ontario Green 
Homes, 2010) 
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among homeowners and other participants with over 19,000 small scale systems that generate 
over 170 MW of predominately solar energy that is subsequently fed into the grid (McInroy, 
2015). With both streams entering their tenth year of operation, Ontario’s Feed-in-Tariff 
programs remains a prime example of a renewable energy deployment initiative that is 
accessible to homeowners and companies that can afford the upfront costs. 
 
The SHRRP and the Renewable Energy Initiative 
 
Three years after the beginning of the FiT program, the Canadian and Ontario 
governments announced the launch of the jointly funded Social Housing Renovation and 
Retrofit Program (SHRRP). The program set out to provide the fiscal means to allow housing 
providers to create healthy and efficient social housing communities by retrofitting poorly 
maintained, vacant or abandoned units (Government of Ontario, 2009, p. 1). Under SHRRP, 
funding was made available to Service Managers, the Ministry of Community and Social 
Services, Rural and Native Housing, and the Ministry of Health and Long Term Care 
(Government of Ontario, 2009, p. 2). The program stipulated that all funds had to be spent 
within two years of the start of the program in 2009 (City of Toronto, 2009). Services Managers 
received different levels of funding depending on the proportion of social housing in their 
service area. Service Managers subsequently distributed funds to social housing providers in 
their jurisdiction under the condition that providers agreed to maintain the tenure of the 
structure as affordable social housing for a minimum of 10 years (Tsenkova, 2013, p. 33; 
Government of Ontario, 2009, p. 2). Due to the proportion of social housing in the region, the 
City of Toronto received over $259 million of the $704 million given to Ontario, which was then 
allocated to cooperatives and non-profits including the Toronto Community Housing 
Corporation (TCHC) (Tsenkova, 2013, p. 41). In total the funds contributed to the renovation of 
over 58,000 social housing units in Toronto (Tsenkova, 2013, p. 38). 
 
Similar to the SHRRP, the $70 million Renewable Energy Initiative (REI) launched in 
2010 was jointly funded by the provincial and federal governments (Region of Peel, 2011). The 
goal of the REI was to further lower operating costs for social housing providers by providing 
funding that allowed them to install renewable energy technologies such as solar photovoltaic, 
solar water heater, geothermal and mid-sized wind technologies (City of Toronto, 2010). The 
initiative is a component of Canada's Economic Action Plan, which outlines a commitment to 
supporting a green economy in provinces such as Ontario (Region of Peel, 2011). Again, Toronto 
received a large portion of REI funds, with $30 million goings toward the deployment of 
renewable energy systems that impacted operational costs for nearly 11,000 social housing units 
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(Tsenkova, 2013, p. 38). Together, the SHRRP and REI were successful in aiding the 
redevelopment of desirable and efficient social housing in communities across Ontario from 
2009 to 2011. Though the issue of ill-maintained social housing was not fully addressed by the 
multi-million dollar programs, they both serve as an example of how the federal and provincial 
governments can work together on issues of housing quality in Ontario. 
 
The Community Energy Partnership Program 
 
In an effort to grow community power in the province, the Ontario Power Authority (OPA) 
launched the Community Energy Partnerships Program (CEPP) in 2010 (Weis, 2011 p. 79). The 
goal of the CEPP was to simplify the process of developing community renewable-energy 
projects in Ontario by providing up to 90 percent of eligible development costs (OPA, 2010). The 
CEPP overcomes the largest barrier to community energy projects which is access to necessary 
finances during the development phase. Projects ranging in size from 10 kW to 10 MW are 
eligible to receive up to $200,000 and those larger than 10 MW have an upper limit of 
$500,000 (Weis, 2011 p. 79). Funding is provided in 2 phases: the first portion is given to 
complete project design and development, and the second portion is given to offset the costs for 
regulatory approvals such as a provincial environmental assessment (OPA, 2010). Participating 
groups have included charities, not-for-profits, farmers and co-ops that without the funding 
would be unable to complete a renewable energy project (OPA, 2010). The CEPP ceased to exist 
in 2015, however the IESO launched a new initiative called the Energy Partnerships Program 
(EPP) on June 27th, 2016 (IESO, 2016a). The EPP consolidates the Community Energy 
Partnerships Program, the Municipal and Public Sector Energy Partnerships Program, the 
Aboriginal Renewable Energy Fund, and the Aboriginal Transmission Fund into one (MaRS, 
2010; IESO, 2016a). The program promotes the participation of indigenous communities, 
cooperatives, municipalities and public sector entities in developing energy projects (IESO, 
2016a). 
 
The program is composed of two funding streams: the Partnership Stream and the Project 
Development Stream. The Partnership stream assists indigenous communities who require 
support and guidance in their pursuit of partners to develop renewable energy projects under 
both the FiT and Large Renewable Procurement programs. The stream provides the same 
support to co-ops, municipalities and public sector entities, but only for the development of 
Ontario FiT projects (IESO, 2016). The maximum amount of funding for the Partnership stream 
is $50,000 (IESO, 2016b, p. 16). The Project Development Stream supports eligible community 
groups with funding for the soft costs associated with developing renewable energy projects 
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under the FiT program (IESO, 2016a). Applicant to this stream can apply for $75,000 per FiT 
project if a community group’s portfolio contains 1-3 separate sites or up to $250,000 for 4 or 
more FiT projects (IESO, EPP Project Development Rules, 2016c, p. 6-7). Among other 
requirements, all applicants to the EPP must detail how the proposed projects will create jobs, 
offer education and training opportunities and enhance economic wellbeing in the community 
(IESO, 2016b, p. 17). Moving forward, the EPP will allow a larger portion of Ontarians to 
overcome the largest barrier to community-owned energy projects by assisting in the acquisition 
of partners and providing funding for projects that generate local clean energy. 
 
Net Metering 
 
Aside from program providing funding for the redevelopment of dilapidated affordable 
housing into green affordable housing, the province of Ontario has also discussed the idea of net 
metering. Net metering refers to the process of monitoring energy use at the site of consumption 
by comparing the output of an at-site energy generation system to the electricity consumed by 
the household (O. Reg 541/05; Environmental Commissioner of Ontario, 2014b, p. 33). Eligible 
structures with generation facilities can reduce their energy costs by exporting surplus energy to 
the grid for credit from their utility provider. In 2006, the provincial government introduced the 
net metering regulations which allow generators of electricity from systems smaller than 500 
kW to have a meter installed that monitors consumption relative to generation, and 
compensates owners with credits that reduce their bill when excess electricity is exported to the 
grid (Adachi and Rowlands, 2009 p. 4; Toronto Hydro, n.d.). Net metering is an important 
element of the province’s culture of conservation, one that rightly endorses reduced 
consumption as the primary way to lower energy costs provincially (City of Toronto, 2009, p. 2). 
This link was reflected in the 2013 LTEP that mentioned the evolution of the microFiT program 
into a net metering program, a concept that was subsequently explored by a working group 
formulated by the Ministry of Energy (Government of Ontario, 2013, p. 6; Environmental 
Commissioner of Ontario, 2014 p. 33). 
 
In December of 2013, the working group began to examine the feasibility of turning 
Ontario’s microFiT program into a net metering program as early as 2018 in order to 
significantly grow the number of renewable energy systems connect to the grid (Environmental 
Commissioner of Ontario, 2014 p. 33). In February of 2016, the Ministry of Energy issued an 
update which outlined that local distributing companies, the IESO, industry professionals and 
the Ontario Energy Board were collaborating on a proposal that will be subsequently posted for 
public comment before the end of the year (Ministry of Energy, 2016). The directive went on to 
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state that the microFiT program will stop accepting application by December 31st, 2017 in 
preparation for the launch of the net metering program the following year (Ministry of Energy, 
2016). 
 
It is undeniable that this initiative is a step in the right direction, however currently the 
majority of participants in the microFiT program that serve to benefit from net metering are 
households in least need of reduced energy costs. A 2009 report by the City of Toronto 
highlighted the future inequity of failing to afford tenants living in rental and social housing 
access to renewable energy and smart metering when it stated: “Vulnerable groups will be hurt 
by smart-metering and rising energy costs because they [are not] shielded from sudden 
increases [in non-renewable energy prices]” (City of Toronto, 2009, p.6). The vulnerability to 
fluctuating energy prices is likely to become a reality for a greater portion of low-income 
Ontarians since the province has committed to increased natural gas dependence in the wake of 
both nuclear plant refurbishments. Thus, in order to not only reduce the projected impacts of 
heightened non-renewable energy dependence for low-income Ontarians, but also allow low-
income groups to adopt an eco-identity, it makes sense now more than ever to implement 
solutions such as solar energy system integration with affordable housing in the province of 
Ontario. Elsewhere in the world, these solutions have been implemented with various policies 
and programs that serve as prime examples of how Ontario can establish a necessary 
relationship between renewables, particularly solar energy, and the affordable housing system. 
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CHAPTER 5 – Residential Solar-Integration 
 
Program Case Studies 
 
5.1: Introduction 
 
 
The United Kingdom (UK) and California are two regions that similar to Ontario are 
considered to be part of the geopolitical ‘West’. Both have histories of ecologically-damaging 
industrialization practices that have contributed to climate change and consequently have 
enacted changes that separate economic growth from environmental degradation. The ‘West’ 
collectively faces the harsh reality of the energy ‘trilemma’, a concept explained by Andy Boston 
in his 2013 article Delivering a secure electricity supply on low carbon pathway. The term 
refers to the combination of three competing issues that governments at all scales continue to 
attempt to address: 
 
1) The unstable economy 
 
2) Creating incentives for carbon reduction 
 
3) Maintaining a secure and affordable energy supply 
 
One strategy that public institutions and private actors in both contexts have recognized as 
a potential blanket solution for the trilemma is increased deployment of solar energy technology 
in residential communities. The continued innovation of solar technology in its various forms 
has contributed to its status as a tool that is typically successful in solving economic, 
environmental and social issues that all spring from the central problem of energy production 
and consumption. The truth of this statement is backed by global growth rates of 35 to 40 
percent for solar photovoltaics, making the technology the fastest growing renewable energy 
source in the world (Reinsberger et al., 2015, p. 179). The UK and California in particular have 
pushed for the increased deployment of renewable technologies with ecological modernization-
based policies in order to successfully meet clean energy and emission reduction targets by the 
year 2020. 
 
As a member of the European Union (EU), the United Kingdom is obliged to meet the 
region’s 20-20-20 targets that were formally adopted in 2008 (Smith et al., 2014, p. 123). The 
strategy aims to reduce CO2 emissions by 20 percent compared to 1990 levels, source 20 percent 
of energy from renewables, and increase energy efficiency by 20 percent (European 
Commission, 2016). In order to plan the successful achievement of these goals, the European 
Commission directed all members of the union to produce a road map describing how they 
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would contribute to achieving the second target (The European Parliament, 2009). The UK 
subsequently released its National Renewable Energy Action Plan (NREAP) which bound the 
region to obtain 15 percent of energy from renewable sources by 2020 (DECC, 2010). 
Additionally, the Parliament of the United Kingdom released the Climate Change Act that legally 
bound the region to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 80 percent by 2050 relative to 1990 
levels, representing a commitment to go above and beyond the GHG reduction targets for the 
European Union (Bolton and Foxon, 2015a, p. 167; Bolton and Foxon, 2015b, p. 541). 
 
Moreover, in California, following a decade of enhanced support for renewable energy, 
Governor Schwarzenegger announced the expansion of financial support for solar generation 
technologies in 2004 under the Million Solar Roofs initiative (CPUC, 2016, p. 1). The initiative 
presents solar energy technology as a strategy that addresses climate change by introducing one 
million rooftop solar power systems that are hypothesized to reduce greenhouse gas emissions 
by three million metric tons (Zahran et al., 2008, p. 433). The initiative was formally enacted 
two years later in 2006 with the ultimate goal of installing three thousand megawatts of new 
solar over a ten year period with $3.3 billion in funding from ratepayers to be used for program 
administration, evaluation and incentives (Hallock, 2015, p. 4). 
 
In order to successfully achieve their decarbonization targets both regions have 
established dedicated programs that encourage the deployment of solar energy technology in 
affordable housing communities. This chapter will examine the social and institutional 
dimensions of solar integrating programs in the United Kingdom and California that contribute 
to a broader understanding of how green affordable housing is not only an important 
decarbonization strategy, but also a huge component of socioeconomic equity as many Western 
nations restructure all elements of society around an eco-identity. 
 
5.2: The United Kingdom 
 
 
Residential Energy Context 
 
Similar to Ontario, the United Kingdom is facing the related issues of fossil fuel 
dependence and greenhouse gas emissions. In the region, 70 percent of domestic, commercial 
and industrial buildings are heated with natural gas (Bolton and Foxon, 2015, p. 538). The 
residential sector alone has 18 to 20 million individual gas boilers installed in dwellings (Bolton 
and Foxon, 2015, p. 538). The dominance of the non-renewable energy source is a result of 
cheap gas being readily available from the conveniently located North Sea reserves that resulted 
in the development of a gas distribution network from the 1960’s onwards (Bolton and Foxon, 
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2015, p. 542). However, in 2004 the region became a net energy importer following a steep 
decline in North Sea-sourced oil and gas after production peaked in 1999 (Office for National 
Statistics, 2015). In 2013, the region imported 47 percent of its energy, a level that had only 
previously been reached in 1974 following the 1973 oil embargo (Office for National Statistics, 
2015). In addition to being vulnerable to fossil fuel dependence, the UK is scheduled to undergo 
closures of all coal fired plants by 2025, a feat achieved by Ontario in 2014 (Mason, 2015). Some 
estimates point to approximately £110 billion in investments in generation, transmission and 
distribution in order to just maintain current levels of consumption (Foxon and Pearson, 2013, 
p. 5). The threat of fossil fuel depletion has generated consistent discussion regarding regional 
energy security and has influenced energy policy to take on an ecologically modern perspective 
that ideally will smoothly guide a transition to a low-carbon energy system. 
 
Energy policy has also stressed the evolution of energy systems within residential 
communities as an important component of the low-carbon transition. In 2003 the Parliament 
of the United Kingdom released the Energy White Paper which promoted “the development of 
homes and communities that combine energy efficient technologies and renewable energy to 
radically reduce their demand for energy from the grid” (DTI, 2003, p. 15). One of the four 
primary goals of the policy was to reduce fuel poverty, an issue that affects 2.34 million 
households in the region (DECC, 2014a). According to the UK government, a household is 
considered to be affected by fuel poverty if they spend more than 10 percent of their annual 
income on fuel costs (DECC, 2015a, p. 10). The rise of wholesale gas prices in 2005 drastically 
increased household energy bills, which effectively created an affordability crisis that peaked in 
2009 with 6 million households being impacted by fuel poverty (Foxon and Pearson, 2013, p. 5; 
DECC, 2015a). Though this figure has declined since 2010, it remains an issue for millions of 
families. Fuel poverty adds to the problem of housing affordability which is exasperated by the 
United Kingdom having the third highest score for housing prices in the European Union and 
tenant households spending more than 40 percent of their income on rent12 (Cuellar, 2014; 
Bachelor, 2015). In order to reprimand the related issues of energy and housing affordability, 
the UK government introduced a number of institutions and programs that aim to improve the 
existing housing stock not only through conservation education, but also renewable energy 
system deployment that eliminates some of the transmission and distribution costs associated 
with centralized energy production. 
 
 
 
12 In the UK, owner-occupied dwelling have the lowest rate of fuel poverty while rented dwellings have the 
highest. (DECC, 2015a, p.7). 
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The Renewables Obligation and the FiT Program 
 
The Renewables Obligation (RO) was an initiative that was active prior to the region 
committing to decarbonization targets set by the European Union and UK Parliament. The 
initiative was gradually introduced in 2002 and placed an obligation on electricity suppliers to 
source a growing portion of energy from renewables (Ofgem, 2016a; DECC, 2015b, p. 172). In 
order to meet the obligations of the program suppliers are required to apply for Renewables 
Obligation Certificates (ROCs) from the Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem) for 
eligible renewable generating stations (Ofgem, 2016a). If licensed electricity suppliers are 
unsuccessful in obtaining ROCs, then they are subsequently required to contribute to a buy-out 
fund for each megawatt of renewable energy they failed to generate13 (Keirstead, 2007, p. 4130; 
Ofgem, 2016a). The by-out fund covers all administrative costs and the residual money is 
distributed back to suppliers in proportion to the amount of renewable energy they produce 
(Ofgem, 2016b). The program was designed as the main government-run financial mechanism 
that provided incentives for large-scale renewable generation (DECC, 2012a, p. 7). 
Subsequently, many hopeful micro-generators had a difficult time navigating the administration 
process of the RO (Keirstead, 2007, p. 4130). 
 
In October of 2008, the Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) was set up by 
Prime Minster Gordon Brown (Foxon and Pearson, 2013, p. 4). The UK Parliament recognized 
that climate change targets would be difficult to achieve without developing shared discourse 
between the conflicting departments of business and regulatory reform (Rogers-Hayden, 2011, 
p. 139). Subsequently, the DECC became responsible for functions previously run by three 
separate departments: Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform, and Environment, Food 
and Rural Affairs (Foxon and Pearson, 2013, p. 4). The department collaborated on a white 
paper released in 2009 that articulated its vision of guiding the transitioning of the region to a 
low carbon economy by 2020 (DECC, 2009, p. 4). Ofgem reviewed the RO in 2009 to bring it 
into closer compliance with the transitional plans of the white paper by instituting changes to 
the ROC process (DECC, 2015b, p. 172). The changes replaced the practice of providing a single 
rate of one ROC per megawatt hour with ‘banding’ (DECC, 2015b, p. 172). Banding permitted 
Ofgem to offer different amounts of ROCs depending on what renewable technology was used 
(DECC, 2012a). The changes resulted in a decline in popularity of the program among large- 
 
 
13 Generators can also buy ROCs from suppliers that have already met their renewable obligation. ROC can be 
purchased for less than the mandatory buyout price per megawatt hour. As of April 1st, 2016, the buyout price per 
megawatt hour is £44.77 which is equal to around $80 CAD (DECC, 2016). 
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scale onshore wind generators, however, there was a subsequent increase in popularity among 
micro generators since residentially-friendly renewables such as solar had higher banding levels 
as figure 5.0 illustrates (Finney et al., 2012, p. 293; DECC 2012b). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Ofgem, 2016c 
 
Figure 5.0 – The graph above shows the amount of support in £ per MWh for various 
eligible Renewable Obligation technologies from 2008 to 2015. Following a review of the 
program in 2009 all technologies were assigned different banding rates. In particular, solar 
peaked from 2013-2014 but declined from 2014-2015 due to a drop in banding rates related to 
the general decline in cost of PV technology. 
 
 
The RO program’s 2015 annual report states that since inception the program has resulted in the 
procurement of 55.7 TWh of renewable energy, representing 18.6 percent of the UK’s total 
electricity supply (Ofgem, 2016d, p. 6). Solar photovoltaics represent 73 percent of capacity 
procured under the RO program from 2014 to 2015 and 3.8 percent of total capacity procured 
since 2007 as figure 5.1 shows (Ofgem, 2016c). 
 
The report went on to explain the continued subtle move away from large-scale generation 
with the closure of the program for solar photovoltaics projects that were 5 MW or greater in 
size as of April 1st 2015 (DECC, 2015b, p. 172; Ofgem, 2016d, p. 6). The program also closed to 
small scale solar and onshore wind on April 1st of 2016 (Ofgem, 2016d, p. 50). The Renewables 
Obligation program remains open until March of 2017 at which point the UK government 
expects the region’s feed-in-tariff program to replace it as the central support mechanism for 
renewable generation (DECC, 2012c, p. 22). 
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Source: Ofgem, 2016c 
 
Figure 5.1 – The above graph summarizes the amount of capacity procured under the Renewable 
Obligation program from 2007 to 2016. Solar photovoltaics were particularly popular from 2014-2015 
despite the reduction in banding rates shown in figure 5.0. 
 
The United Kingdom established a feed-in-tariff (FiT) program in April of 2010 that had 
the goal of incentivizing the deployment of systems smaller than 5 MW for households and 
organizations that had not engaged with the Renewables Obligation scheme (Finney, 2012, p. 
294). Similar to the Ontario FiT program, owners of structures that installed small-scale solar 
photovoltaics were compensated for the energy generated and exported back to the grid. 
However, the program differs from Ontario’s in that licensed energy suppliers in the UK are 
required to administrate the program and pay tariffs to generators instead of an entity of the UK 
government (Ofgem, 2016e). In some instances, suppliers have to make two tariff payments to 
system owners; one for generation of energy and another for exporting renewable electricity to 
the grid (Ofgem, 2016e). All licensed electricity suppliers with more than 250,000 customers are 
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required to participate in the FiT scheme (Ofgem, 2016e). There are two ways that a system can 
be financed. The first requires the household to pay for all upfront investment costs of a system 
which allows them to receive the full value of FiT income while also saving on electricity bills 
(Saunders et al., 2012, p. 80). In some instance, housing associations or social housing landlords 
take out a loan for the cost of materials and installation and use the FiT tariffs to pay off the loan 
charges (Saunders et al., 2012, p. 80). In such a scenario the association or landlord makes the 
equivalent of 472 Canadian dollars per year for every 2 kW of capacity installed (Saunders et al., 
2012, p. 80). Once the system is paid off the annual income from the system can be reinvested in 
the community, contributing to the eradication of fuel poverty among those with the lowest 
incomes. 
 
Though the upfront payment scheme allows for full retention of FiT income, it is not 
accessible to individual low-income households that live in private market housing that seek to 
participate in decarbonization practices. Subsequently the PAYGen scheme is offered to remedy 
issues of cash-flow access experienced by low-income communities. A third party company 
unaffiliated with the licensed electricity providers will install a photovoltaic system or any other 
renewable energy system free of charge. The household receives the energy bill savings that 
come with at-site solar generation, and the third party company receives the generation and 
export tariffs over the lifetime of the system (20-25 year for solar photovoltaics) as payment 
(Saunders et al., 2012, p. 80). Under the PAYGen scheme, a household saves the equivalent of 
180 to 220 Canadian dollars that is a notable boost to total income for simply deciding to engage 
directly with renewable energy technology (DWP, 2010). 
 
Within the first two years of the FiT program the number of PV installations rose 
drastically, which triggered the initiation of a comprehensive review from 2011-2012 led by 
acting Energy Secretary Chris Huhne (DECC, 2015b, p. 173; Smith et al., 2014, p. 125). The 
review resulted in the enactment of a cost control mechanism that reduced tariffs every 3 
months in order to compensate for the steady decline of the costs associated with solar 
photovoltaics (DECC, 2015b, p. 173). Figure 5.2 shows historical, present and future FiT rates 
for solar photovoltaic systems ranging in size from 4 kW to 1 MW. 
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 FiT Year Generation Tariff Rate Export Tariff 
 (pence* per kilowatt hour) Rate 
   
2010-2011 35.07 - 49.43 3.48 
   
2011-2012 9.69 - 49.43 3.48 
   
2012-2013 7.50 - 22.86 4.91 
   
2013-2014 7.23 - 16.30 4.91 
   
2014-2015 6.46 - 14.79 4.91 
   
2015-2016 3.08 - 13.55 4.91 
   
2016-2017 0.74 - 7.68 4.91 
   
2017-2018 0.41 - 7.61 4.91 
   
2018-2019 0.15 - 7.55 4.91 
   
*10 pence is equivalent to 18 to 20 Canadian cents. Source: Ofgem, 2016 
 
Figure 5.2 – The table summarizes FiT rates from 2010 to 2019. Rates differ depending on 
the size of the solar photovoltaic system and if the system is stand alone. A significant decrease 
in generation tariff occurred in 2011 due to the popularity of the program and a decline of the 
cost of solar in the UK and the European Union. 
 
 
Moreover, the review also spawned the creation of a multi-installation tariff. The tariff 
is given to generators who own more than twenty-five PV installations located on different sites 
(DECC, 2012d). Many social landlords with multiple properties fall into this category of tariffs 
which subsequently reduces the amount of tariffs they receive by 20 percent for every property 
procured through the program after the twenty-fifth site (DECC, 2012d). The impacts of the 
reduction were felt by the social housing sector that not only lost long-term revenue, but also the 
eco-economic benefits of projects that were abandoned when the reduced tariff was announced 
(Clark and Hay, 2012). Thus, the reduction is an example of an economically-guided decision 
that is counter to the broader eco-modern goal of engaging populations that have previously 
been excluded from renewable generation and decarbonization program. 
 
Additionally, the Electricity Market Reform (EMR) introduced formally by the 2013 
Energy Act projects the launch of a Contracts for Difference (CfD) FiT program that will replace 
the Renewables Obligation when it is phased out in 2017 (Ofgem, 2016f). A Contract for 
Difference is a formal agreement between a renewable energy generator and the Low Carbon 
Contracts Company (LCCC) that mandates the generator be paid the difference between the 
strike price and the reference price (DECC, 2015c). The strike price is the cost of investing in a 
low carbon technology and the reference price is the average market price for electricity in the 
region (DECC, 2015 EMR CfD). The benefits of CfD are that it removes the volatility of 
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wholesale prices from the renewable energy generation equation (DECC, 2015c), and protects 
consumers engaging with renewable technologies from electricity price spikes. This scheme will 
likely attract social housing providers that previously have been hesitant to engage with 
renewables for fear of drastic tariff drops as was the case in the past. Overall, the Renewables 
Obligation and FiT programs represent an important origin point for the pairing of housing and 
solar energy systems and their continued redevelopment ensures that domestic renewable 
energy is an important part of decarbonization and affordability goals. 
 
 
The Renewable Heat Premium Payment Scheme and the Renewable Heat Initiative 
 
The Renewable Heat Premium Payment Scheme (RHPP) and the Domestic Renewable 
Heat Initiative (RHI) are two related programs that also facilitated the integration of solar 
technology with affordable housing in the UK. Launched in August of 2011 by the DECC, the 
 
RHPP had the goal of accelerating the deployment of renewable heating technologies in the UK’s 
social housing sector (DECC, 2012e). Eligible providers would bid for a one-time grant that 
could be claimed after they installed a renewable heating project that sourced its energy from 
biomass, air, the sun or ground source heat (DECC, 2012e; Ofgem, 2016g). The Energy Savings 
Trust administered grants to successful applicants during the three phases of the program that 
spanned from August of 2011 to March of 2014. 
 
During the first phase, 37 social landlords were granted the equivalent of 6.9 million 
Canadian dollars which allowed them to install just under 1000 renewable heating systems for 
lower-income households (DECC, 2012e). By the third phase of the program funding for social 
housing-sited projects tripled to the equivalent of 18.2 million Canadian dollars (DECC, 2012f), 
illustrating the undeniable popularity and success of the program among those that served to 
benefit from it the most. The DECC interviewed tenants throughout each phase of the program 
and the majority had a positive reaction to the upgrades and became engaged with learning 
about the performance of the systems (DECC, 2012e). Similarly, social landlords were more than 
willing to participate in the RHPP scheme because it allowed them to offer tenants a solution to 
fuel poverty while also lowering maintenance costs (DECC, 2015d p. 7). The DECC’s RHPP 
summary report revealed that the two main motivating factors for participation were reducing 
dependence on fossil fuels and cost savings (DECC, 2015d, p. 9), a fact that revealed how 
decisions at residential scale are increasingly guided by eco-economic rationale. However, some 
smaller social landlords highlighted barriers to participation, such as a lack of tenant 
engagement throughout the process and a lack of clarity of information about renewable 
technology and their suppliers (DECC, 2015d, p. 7). The DECC acknowledged that social housing 
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represented a significant share of the sites of RHPP-funded projects, and sees value in 
remedying barriers by developing a more effective administrative process that has an 
educational component. The summary report highlighted that community groups should be 
recruited to play a support role in the process of tenant engagement and educate participating 
communities about the renewable technology and its resultant benefits (DECC, 2015d, p. 11). 
 
The RHPP was eventually closed in March of 2014 and replaced by the Domestic 
Renewable Heat Initiative in April14. Similar to the RHPP, the RHI promotes household to 
switch from fossil fuel to renewable-sourced heating systems (DECC, 2015b, p. 173). The DECC 
administers the program to eligible homeowners, private landlords and social landlords on or 
off the grid who wanted to install renewable technologies such as solar hot water heaters on 
domestic structures (UK Parliament, 2016). Participants receive RHI payments for seven years 
that vary depending on the type of system and the amount of energy produced (DECC, 2013, p. 
13). For example a mid-floor flat with a solar thermal heater would receive approximately 600 
Canadian dollars a year if they are paid the 2016 rate of 19.74 pence per kilowatt hour 
guaranteed by the RHI15. Since the program's inception over 16,000 renewable heating systems 
have been installed, 23 percent of which are solar hot water heaters (Wilson, 2015). In terms of 
eligible group participation, private and social properties owned by landlords account for 8.9 
percent of all RHI-funded projects (Wilson, 2015) showing a potential regression in engagement 
of low-income households. Unfortunately, the DECC has not yet released a summary report 
highlighting the opinions of participants in a way that replicates the RHPP 2015 report, so it is 
unclear exactly why social and private landlords have backed away from renewable heating 
despite yearly increases in tariffs. It is likely that low fossil fuel prices in 2015 and 2016 have 
contributed to this drop-off in interest (Elliot, 2015) and consequently have slowed down the 
decarbonization transition. However, a potential future price spike in fossil fuels could influence 
a resurgence of popularity of domestically-focused affordable renewable heating programs in the 
UK. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14 The RHI program is split into 2 streams: non-domestic and domestic. The non-domestic RHI was launched in 
2011. This chapter exclusively talks about the domestic stream.  
15 These rates were calculated using the DECC’s Renewable Heat Initiative Calculator. The interface prompts users 
to input where they live and in what type of housing in order to generate an estimate of annual savings achieved if 
they were to deploying renewable energy technologies. The calculator is available at https://renewable-heat-
calculator.service.gov.uk/Default.aspx 
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The Urban Community Energy Fund 
 
Outside of DECC and Ofgem administered programs, several non-profits and charities 
have funds set up that help low-income households with energy bills and retrofits; the Centre for 
Sustainable Energy (CSE) is one such charity. CSE is a national charity that has been active since 
1979 with a mission to empower people to change the way they think about energy (CSE, 2016). 
The charity currently has 60 separately-funded projects that help communities “meet real needs 
for both environmentally sound and affordable energy services” (CSE, 2016). In November 2014 
the DECC gave the CSE the responsibility to administer the Urban Community Energy Fund 
(UCEF) in partnership with another community energy charity, Pure Leapfrog (CSE, 2014). The 
£10 million fund provides community groups16 in England the opportunity to apply for grants 
or loans that provide financial support through the development phase of energy projects 
(DECC, 2014b). Eligible technologies included wind turbines, hydro power, solar PV, solar 
thermal, biomass and anaerobic digestion and project can range in size from 0.5 to 3 gigawatts 
(DECC, 2014b, p. 4). The maximum funding for a grant is £20,000 while loans have a ceiling of 
£130,000 (CSE, 2014). The program only requires the repayment of loans and a 45 percent 
premium17 if the community is successful in completing a project and makes a profit from it 
(DECC, 2014b, p. 4). The premium helps cover the costs of loans that are never repaid due to 
unsuccessful projects and also allows the program to continue to offer support to new 
communities (DECC, 2014b). 
 
The UCEF website shows a map of the location of 30 successful applications in 
England, including 5 groups in London (CSE, 2016). One of these 5 projects is run by South East 
London Community Energy (SELCE), a group awarded a grant to assist with the cost of a 
feasibility study and public consultation (CSE, 2016). SELCE aims to help reduce fuel poverty in 
London among Greenwich and Lewisham residents who also share the vision of contributing to 
the UK’s transition to a low carbon society (SELCE, 2016). The group was successful in raising 
£250,000 in investment from the surrounding community in 2015 that financed the installation 
of solar PV on four schools (SELCE, 2016). The system prevents over 94 tonnes of CO2 emissions 
from being released each year, saves the school £358,000 in electricity costs over 20 years and 
will produce £90,000 of surplus clean energy that is available to locals who participate in the 
community share offer by contributing a minimum of £250 to initial 
 
16 In order to be eligible a group must be located in an urban area recognized by the Office of National Statistics 
(DECC, 2014b).  
17 The 45 percent premium is not the same as interest since it does not accumulate over time. For example, if a 
group borrows £100,000 they would have to repay £145,000 regardless of how long the loan lasts (CSE, 2014). 
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investment costs that subsequently is repaid with four percent interest (SELCE, 2016). Overall, 
the UCEF initiative is a great example of a flexible program that places a majority of control and 
responsibility for affordable decarbonization in the hands of locals seeking to improve quality of 
life and the communal relationship with the environment. 
 
Stagnation of Decarbonization Progress in the UK 
 
The UCEF was established during the middle of a larger scheme known as the Green 
Deal. Launched, in 2013 alongside the Energy Company Obligation18 (ECO), the Green Deal 
(GD) sought to create an energy efficiency market that did not require ongoing public support 
and reduced barriers to uptake of domestic energy retrofits (Gillich et al., 2016, p. 3). The 
general GD provided loans to owners of domestic buildings seeking to increase energy efficiency 
with updated insulation (Daikin, 2012, p. 4). Though it was not an enforced regulation of the 
program, the ideal situation was for loan repayment to be less than monthly savings in energy 
costs. Participants could also pair savings from the FiT program and the Green Deal that led to 
thousands of pounds being saved over the lifetime of a renewable energy system (DECC, 2013, p. 
17). Additional sub-programs such as GD Cashback, the Home Improvement Fund and the GD 
Communities scheme were eventually added in order to increase program flexibility (Gillich et 
al., 2016, p. 3). 
 
Though the GD was marketed as the “biggest home improvement program since the 
Second World War” (Vaughan, 2015), participation in the scheme was relatively low with just 
over 15,000 loans issued two years into the program (DECC, 2015e, p. 17). Furthermore, several 
academic reports were released criticizing the Green Deal for neglecting to address barriers to 
uptake besides upfront costs and placing too much attention on ‘low priority’ energy issues 
 
(Eyre et al., 2013; Rosenow and Eyre, 2013). On July 23, 2015 the DECC halted funding to the 
Green Deal Finance Company and cited low uptake as the reason for closing the program 
(Gillich et al., 2016, p. 3). No successor program is scheduled to be launched in place of the 
Green Deal so homeowners no longer have the extra source of support for energy efficiency 
retrofits. However, the Energy Company Obligation remains active and continues to service 
lower income households with poor energy efficiency. 
 
 
18 The Energy Company Obligation is a ratepayer-funded scheme also introduced in January of 2013 that required 
energy supplier’s to deliver domestic energy efficiency measures to low-income consumers in particular. The 
program explicitly states a goal of targeting hard-to-treat properties in order to reduce the percentage of UK 
households with insufficiently insulated housing. The Green Deal and ECO are separate programs but a GD 
assessment is a perquisite for accessing ECO funding (DECC, 2012) 
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The end of the Green Deal was one of several changes made by the Conservative 
government elected in 2015 that stagnated the pace of progress toward emission reduction 
goals. The Conservatives also ended all subsidies for onshore wind, stunted fiT small-scale solar 
subsides by 87 percent and axed future plans for new built zero-carbon homes (Vaughan, 2015; 
Carrington, 2015). The provided rationale behind the slashing of support for renewable energy 
was that subsidies were rising too fast, particularly for solar, which conservative ministers 
believed was costing energy consumers too much; the Conservative government later admitted 
that the reduction in small-scale solar subsidies will only save energy consumers 50 pence a year 
(Macalister, 2015). All of these changes were made the same year that wind, solar and bioenergy 
surpassed coal and became responsible for generating 25 percent of electricity in the UK 
(Carrington, 2015). Rather than continuing the trend of increased clean energy, the 
Conservative government has opted to turn back to fossil fuel with a £20 million fund for oil and 
gas seismic surveys on the UK Continental Shelf (DECC, 2016). Numerous renewable energy 
advocates have spoken out about the damage the cuts will cause to the renewable energy 
industry and decarbonization progress including former chairman of Shell, Lord Oxburgh. The 
ex-chairman highlighted that in order for the North Sea oil industry to gain traction, consistent 
aid from the UK government was integral, therefore the same long-term government support is 
necessary for the clean energy industry to establish itself as a stable and thriving sector 
(Macalister, 2015). Despite widespread opposite to their decisions, the Conservative government 
remains steadfast on draining funds from clean energy initiatives and pumping them into the 
environmentally-damaging and economically volatile fossil fuel industry. Only time will tell if 
this decision is beneficial or damaging to the wellbeing of the region. 
 
Benefits of Policies and Programs 
 
Despite the 2015 political shift, the UK has gained a number of benefits from the 
existence of domestic energy efficiency retrofit programs. One obvious benefit of these programs 
is the increased deployment of sustainable energy. With solar photovoltaic generation 
accounting for 4.1 TWh and solar thermal producing 52 kites of renewable heat, sun-powered 
technologies continue to dominate growth in the clean energy sector from year to year due to the 
ease of integration with existing structures (DECC, 2015b, p. 1-11). In particular, the FiT 
program has resulted in the deployment of 2,540,110 kW of domestic and 54,966 kW of 
community renewable energy capacity, representing 57 and 1.2 percent of the programs total 
installed capacity (Ofgem, 2016h). Solar photovoltaics are the dominant technology for both 
domestic and community projects with over 361,000 separate projects that on average are 4kW 
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in size currently receiving FiT tariffs (Ofgem, 2016h). Projects installed in 2014 alone saved 2 
million tonnes of CO2 from being produced (Ofgem, 2015). 
 
Moreover, at least 5,000 community groups have commenced or completed a renewable 
energy project, many of which received Renewables Obligation, UCEF or ECO funding (DECC, 
2014c, p. 16). Prior to subsidy cuts, the DECC hypothesized that community energy generation 
schemes such as solar panel installations on social housing could supply enough electricity for 
one million homes by 2020 (DECC, 2014d). The potential to achieve such a milestone still exists, 
but the UK Government must support energy efficiency initiatives in a variety of communities so 
that they are not just present on owner-occupied dwellings with households capable of financing 
upfront costs. In fact, a study on the impacts of small scale renewable energy on fuel poverty in 
the UK revealed that renewable installations on low income households are more likely to be 
completed when they are facilitated by third party local energy organizations, since these groups 
remove the risks associated with energy projects by coordinating funding and negotiating the 
best deals possible from material and labour suppliers (Saunders, 2012, p.9). Also, encouraging 
community-led renewable energy projects saves participants money, which in turn can be fed 
back into the community through local purchases (DECC, 2014c, p. 47). The increased economic 
investment in the local community contributes to another benefit which is the development of 
communal pride. Participants in a community energy scheme rally around the idea of being a 
part of projects that brings positive attention to areas that otherwise may often be regarded as 
run-down. This sense of pride is driven by and reinforces an eco-identity that influences 
households engaging with renewable energy to put additional thought into how else they can 
improve their solar-powered community to ensure the feeling is a lifelong sentiment. Ultimately, 
replicating the cost savings, engagement and communal pride within various neighbourhoods 
will continue to contribute to traditionalizing decarbonization pathways in the United Kingdom 
that are accessible and affordable to a diversity of households. 
 
5.3: California 
 
 
Residential Energy Context 
 
Though on the opposite side of the Continent, the state of California shares a number of 
North-American socioeconomic experiences with Ontario that have resulted in parallels between 
the two regions. The most obvious of these parallels is that both are their nation’s most populous 
regions, placing greater responsibility on the shoulders of service providers within their borders. 
Home to 13 percent of the US population, California consumes more energy than its four 
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neighbouring states combined and has one of the largest electricity use profiles in the United 
States (Izadian et al., 2013, p.23; Langlois-Bertrand et al., 2012, p. 11). Just years prior to 
Ontario taking the same action, California deregulated wholesale electricity and began operating 
a spot market in 1998 (Reis and White, 2003, p. 1). Between 1999 and 2000 wholesale electricity 
market prices increased by 500 percent, causing the state two largest utilities - Pacific Gas & 
Electric and Southern California Edison - to pay more for wholesale power than what they were 
able to resell it for (Joskow, 2001, p. 365). The spike in price was caused by a number of factors, 
including rising natural gas prices, a drought in the Northwest that impacted hydroelectric 
imports and companies, such as Enron, that took advantage of congestion relief payments and 
transmission charges built into the newly restructured energy system (Weare, 2003; Joskow, 
2001, p. 377). Unable to keep up with the costs, both utilities stopped paying their debts to 
energy companies who in turn stopped selling power to them, leading to the California energy 
crisis (Reis and White, 2003, p. 1). As a result, several state-ordered rolling blackouts occurred 
during the first half of 2001, the largest one impacting 1.5 million customers for two days in 
March (PBS, 2001). 
 
Though a retail price cap regulation insulated residential consumers from the economic 
costs of energy, the state is still afflicted by an unaffordable housing system. California has some 
of the nation’s highest housing costs with median home prices 2.5 times the national level and 
low-to-moderate tenant households using on average 35 percent of their income to pay rent 
(Kroll and Singa, 2008, p. 28). The issue has continued to worsen with 90 percent of all low-
income households (those earning less than $35,000), and 53 percent of middle income 
households spending 30 percent or more of their total income on housing (Christopher, 2016). 
Recognizing the havoc that natural gas dependence among other factors had caused it, the state 
began establishing new energy regulations and programs under the Million Solar Roofs 
Initiative that would further reduce energy costs, several of which made a point of emphasizing a 
relationship between solar energy technology and low-to-moderate income housing. 
 
 
The Renewables Portfolio Standard and the California Solar Initiative 
 
Initially established in 2002, the Renewables Portfolio Standard (RPS) Program was 
expanded in 2011 to required energy service providers in the state to increase renewable energy 
resources to 33 percent of total procurement by 202019 (Centre for Sustainable Energy, 2015, p. 
5). The program is a very ambitious environmental undertaking and a declaration to the rest of 
 
19 The RPS has intermittent goals of 20 percent by the end of 2013 and 25 percent by the end of 2016 
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the country that California is committed to transforming its previously weak, import-dependent 
energy system into a flexible heterogeneous one that equally values the environmental and 
economic benefits of energy generation sources. In order to establish a self-sustaining solar 
industry that contributes to this transformation, the California Public Utilities Commission 
 
(CPUC) and the California Energy Commission (CEC) established a $3.3 billion USD ‘Million 
Solar Roofs’ fund in 2007 (Bichkoff et al., 2015, p. 7). Over ten years the fund aims to install 
3000 megawatts of new solar (Bichkoff et al., 2015p. 8) The California Solar Initiative (CSI) is a 
sub-program authorized by Governor Schwarzenegger in 2006 and administrated by the CPUC 
with a $2.167 billion USD budget that funds the installation of 1,940 megawatts of new solar 
capacity (CPUC, 2014, p. 7). The CSI only provides funding in the form of cash rebates or tariffs 
for the installation of solar energy systems on existing buildings (Langlois-Betrand, 2012, p. 18). 
It should be noted that the program is separate from the RPS, however the initiative’s ultimate 
goal of creating a solar-industry free from ratepayer subsidies by 2017 will ideally make 
achievement of the 2020 RPS target easier. The CSI is made up of five sub-programs: 
 
- The General Market Program 
 
- The Single-Family Affordable Solar Homes (SASH) Program 
 
- The Multifamily Affordable Solar Housing (MASH) Program 
 
- The CSI Thermal Program 
 
- The Research Development and Demonstration Program (RD&D) 
 
 
The next section will look at the SASH, MASH and thermal programs since they specifically 
shine a light on solar integration practices that target low-to-moderate income housing. 
 
 
The SASH and MASH and CSI Solar Thermal Programs 
 
Ten percent of the CSI budget is designated for use by low-income affordable housing 
communities as the initiative has an explicit goal of enabling those with the least means to 
become solar adopters (CPUC, 2014, p. 5). Two sub-programs of the CSI split the $216 million 
USD set aside for these communities; the first was the Single-family Affordable Solar Homes 
(SASH) program. The SASH program had an initial budget of $108 million USD and was 
administrated by the non-profit renewable service provider GRID Alternatives (Navigant 
Consulting, 2011a, p. 9). The program sought to reduce energy bills for low-income households, 
decreasing the overall cost of solar ownership and ultimately “provide energy solutions that are 
environmentally and economically sustainable” (Navigant Consulting, 2015a, p. 2). In May of 
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2009, GRID Alternatives began accepting applications from low-income Californians living in 
single-family housing for SASH 1.0 (Bichkoff et al., P. 30). Households were eligible to apply for 
full subsidization of a 1 to 1.2 kW system if they owned their home and the total household 
income is 50 percent of the average median income (AMI) or lower (U.S. Department of Energy, 
2016). Those making more than 50 but less than 80 percent of the AMI are eligible for partial 
subsidization for a system sized to make the home a net zero dwelling (U.S. Department of 
Energy, 2016; Navigant Consulting, 2011a). When they apply for SASH program incentives, 
applicants are also required to apply to an additional energy efficiency initiative called the LIEE 
program20 that helps participants update energy efficiency measures before the solar system is 
installed (CPUC, 2014 p. 192). The provided subsidies for households making more than 50 
percent of the AMI varied depending on the applicant household’s income and eligibility for the 
 
California Alternative Rate for Energy (CARE) program which subsidizes the cost of gas bills 
(Bichkoff et al., 2015, p. 32; U.S. Department of Energy, 2016). GRID Alternatives also provides 
green job training opportunities, and actively engages with the communities of participants to 
increase awareness and knowledge about the environmental and economic benefits of solar 
energy (Bichkoff et al., 2015 p. 31). 
 
The second program that received $108 million USD of dedicated funds for low-income 
communities is the Multifamily Affordable Solar Housing (MASH) program also launched in 
2009. The program provides financial incentives for retrofits of multi-unit affordable housing 
and has three program administrators: Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E), Southern California 
Edison (SCE) and the Centre for Sustainable Energy (CSE) (Navigant Consulting, 2011b, p. 1). 
Similar to the SASH program, the MASH program strives to decrease electricity costs, increase 
solar adoption in the affordable housing sector and increase awareness about the benefits of 
solar in low-income communities (Bichkoff et al., 2015, p. 34). The program originally provided 
two different tracks of incentives to successful applicants, however, in 2011 one track was 
eliminated due to a stronger demand for the other (CPUC, 2015, p. 5). The remaining incentive 
is composed of two categories: 1A and 1B. 1A incentives are given to building owners who have 
installed solar PV systems that offset common area load21, while 1B incentives are given to 
 
 
20 The Low-Income Energy Efficiency (LIEE) Program has been run by the CPUC since the 1980’s. The program has a goal 
of reducing the number of low-income households burdened by energy costs and establishing energy efficiency as the 
states most important energy resource. The LIEE program requires utilities to connect with community-based 
organizations and provide low-income Californians with energy education programs, energy efficient appliances and 
weatherization services at no charge. (CPUC, 2014).  
21 Common area load includes all energy used to power hallways, security lighting, parking lots and recreational 
centers in multi-unit residential buildings 
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tenants for systems that offset individual unit electrical load (CPUC, 2014, p. 5; CPUC, 2015). In 
some instances, one property can receive both 1A and 1B incentives for a project that offsets 
common area and tenant load (CPUC, 2014, p. 63). The 2015 California Solar Initiative Annual 
Report provided an example of such a scenario: 
 
If a 100 kW solar installation offsets both common area and tenant load, and 60 
percent of the electricity output of the system is dedicated to common area load 
and 40 percent of the electricity output is dedicated to tenant load, the 
Applicant will receive Track 1A incentives for 60 kW and Track 1B incentives for 
40 kW. 
 
(Bichkoff et al., 2015) 
 
For a system to receive both these incentives it would need to be integrated with virtual net 
metering (VNM). Virtual net metering measures the electrical usage for each unit that belongs to 
a single low-income housing enterprise and compares it to the electricity generate by the system 
in kilowatts per hour when it is fed into the grid (CPUC, 2015, p. 7). As Figure 5.3 shows, each 
unit is allocated a share of the renewable energy based on the size of their unit and electricity 
load which in turn is used to calculate the level of incentives they receive from the MASH 
program (CPUC, 2015, p. 7). In California, virtual net metering was first adopted as a pilot 
program for MASH program participants, and in 2011 the CPUC made the tariff available to all 
multi-tenant properties, thereby making solar increasingly accessible to rental complexes, 
cooperatives and condominiums in the state (Bichkoff et al., 2015 p. 39). The MASH program 
also offers a third-party financing model in the form of power purchase agreements (PPAs). 
Each PPA provider finances all costs associated with installing, operating and maintaining the 
system, and sells the power produced to the customer on a per kWh basis for an agreed upon 
period (McCutchan et al., 2011, p. i). 
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Source: CSE, 2015a 
 
Figure 5.3 – The diagram illustrates the process of virtual net metering in multifamily 
housing. The energy used by each residential unit is monitored in order to virtually allocate 
energy produced by the solar PV system to each household on their energy bill. 
 
When the SASH 1.0 and MASH 1.0 program funding neared exhaustion, the California 
legislature passed AB-217 in 2013 which established an additional $108 million in funding to be 
split between both initiatives (Bichkoff et al., 2015 p. 31). In 2015, both programs began their 
second phase, each with $54 million USD in new funds and a combined capacity target of 50 
megawatts of solar PV (Navigant Consulting, 2015a, p. xi). Since SASH 2.0 received less funding 
than the first phase, the CPUC authorized GRID Alternatives to use a third-party ownership 
model to assist in financing the installation of projects at no additional cost to low-income 
participants (Bichkoff et al., 2015, p. 32). Also, under SASH 2.0, subsidies no longer vary 
depending on a household’s income as they are set at $3.00 USD per watt for all participating 
households making more than 50 but less than 80 percent of California's average median 
income (Bichkoff et al., 2015, p. 31). Since program inception in 2009, 5,186 SASH-funded 
projects have been installed across California and over 100 are scheduled to be interconnected 
(GRID Alternatives, 2016 p. 3). Moreover, as of June 2015, 349 projects totalling 23 megawatts 
have been completed with the help of MASH program funds and an additional 40 are in 
progress (Bichkoff et al., 2015 p. 10). 
 
Another initiative that grants low-income households access to cost-saving solar 
technologies is the CSI Thermal program. Established in January of 2010, the CSI Thermal 
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program offers incentives to businesses and households that install solar water heating (SWH) 
technologies to displace natural gas use (Bichkoff et al., 2015, p. 38). The $250 million USD 
program has the goal of promoting the installation of 200,000 SWH systems by the end of 2017 
as a method of reducing California's natural gas dependence (Bichkoff et al., 2015, p. 38). Three 
of the four program administrators22 are Independent Operating Utilities (IOUs) that receive a 
percentage of incentive funding proportionate to the amount of customers they service. In 
March of 2012 the CSI Thermal low-income program was launched and received ten percent of 
the initial program funds to be used exclusively to promote the installation of SWH systems on 
single and multifamily low-income housing (Bichkoff et al., 2015, p. 41). In order to be eligible 
for the general program incentives, participants must already have a SWH system installed by 
certified contractors (Bichkoff et al., 2015, p. 41). Moreover, low-income participants must meet 
the same requirements of the general program as well as living in a home that is financed with 
low-income housing tax credits or a residential complex where at least 20 percent of the units 
are sold or rented to lower income households (Bichkoff et al., 2015, p. 42). 
 
All incentives are paid based on the expected amount of displaced natural-gas generated 
energy in the first year and incentive levels decline as the CSI Thermal program meets certain 
total installation benchmarks (CPUC, 2016b). Participating low-income single-family and 
multifamily projects receive incentives 200 and 150 percent higher than the general program 
incentives but do have upper limit caps as the program progresses and rates decline (Bichkoff et 
al., 2015, p. 43). In terms of participation, the program has approved over 2,500 applications 
and administered $33.7 million USD in incentives since it began in 2010 (Bichkoff et al., 2015, 
p. 45). Overall, each of the three discussed CSI sub-programs have been designed to maximize 
the use of funds sourced from ratepayers, while also providing acceptable incentives that 
encourage continued solar adoption within low-to-moderate income communities. 
 
The New Solar Housing Program 
 
Outside of incentives aiding the retrofit process of existing housing, the state of 
California also offers a program that encourages developers to integrate solar photovoltaics into 
their new residential projects. The New Solar Housing Program (NSHP) is an initiative separate 
from the CSI established in 2007 that seeks to install 360 megawatts of new solar PV in ten 
years and simultaneously create a self-sustaining residential solar market in California (CESA, 
 
22 The program administrators for the CSI Thermal program are Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E), SoCalGas, San 
Diego Gas & Electric (SDG&E) and Centre for Sustainable Energy (CSE). SoCalGas received 51 percent of program 
funds allocated for incentives. (Bichkoff et al., 2015). 
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2015 p. 1; Langlois-Betrand et al., 2012, p. 18). The NSHP provides funding for four types of 
projects: subdivisions, custom homes, affordable housing and common areas for multifamily 
housing (CESA, 2015, p. 11). All project incentives are taken directly from the California Energy 
Commission’s Renewable Resource Trust Fund (CEC, 2015 p. 3). 
 
NSHP rebates are issued once the solar energy system is operational and vary not only 
based on project type, but also depending on if the property is or is not owned by a tax-exempt 
entity (CEC, 2015, p. 2; CESA, 2015, p. 3). Full subsidization for the cost of systems is not 
provided, however affordable housing projects receive rebates for 75 percent of the total system 
costs, while all other projects receive a 50 percent rebate (CEC, 2015, p. 31). New residential 
housing and building owners can finance the purchase and installation of the solar PV system 
out of pocket, through a lease arrangement, or using third-party agreements that are the same 
as those used to complete SASH and MASH program installations (CESA, 2015, p. 16). As the 
NSHP program comes closer to achieving its megawatt goal, incentive levels will gradually 
decline. As of March 2015, the NSHP has offered rebates for over 14,000 solar PV systems 
totalling 45 megawatts and 19,000 additional homes with a solar capacity of over 55 megawatts 
are under construction (CESA, 2015, p. 2). Though owners of new production homes have 
received a majority of the issued rebates, the average amount they are given is only twenty 
percent of the average rebate provided to affordable housing participants (CESA, 2015, p. 13). 
The enhanced funding given to low-income Californians is an example of how the state 
acknowledges that issues of equity can and should be partially remedied with ecologically 
modern policy and programs that increasingly will shape the development of urban areas. 
The GTSR and ECR Programs 
 
The state of California recognized that certain households could not benefit from the CSI 
and New Solar Housing incentive programs due to the inability of the structure they live in to 
support a renewable energy system. To reprimand this gap in access, the state established two 
solar share programs: the Green Tariff Shared Renewables (GTSR) program and the Enhanced 
Community Renewables (ECR) program. Both programs were the result of action taken by 
Pacific Gas & Electric and San Diego Gas & Electric to create a statewide voluntary solar access 
program in 2012 (CSE, 2015, p. 10). Applications submitted by both utilities to create the 
program were consolidated in July of 2013, and in October Senate Bill 43 was passed 
establishing the GTSR and ECR programs (Sen. Bill 43, 2013). Senate Bill 43 places a cap on 
renewable energy project sources for both the GTSR and ECR program at 600 megawatts. The 
bill goes on to state that 100 MW of shared solar capacity must be located within communities 
identified by the California Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) as the most 
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disadvantaged23 in order to allow these communities the environmental benefits of renewable 
systems and the green jobs they create (Sen. Bill 43, 2013; CSE, 2015, p. 13). Additionally the bill 
reserves 100 MW for residential customer participation (Sen. Bill 43, 2013). 
 
The GTSR program allows Californian’s living in structures unsuitable for on-site 
renewable systems to apply for a green rate offered by their utility which enables them to have 
50 to 100 percent of their electrical load sourced from off-site renewable electrical generation 
facilities (CSE 2015, p. 7). Furthermore, upon being granted a green rate from their utilities, 
customers lock in their energy costs for a year, insulating them from energy price spikes (CSE, 
2015). The green rate is made possible by a separate agreement between the utilities and solar 
developers that requires the former to pay the latter for a particular project's energy output. 
 
The ECR program differs from the GTSR in that customers establish an agreement with a 
solar developer of their choice that enables them to buy the rights to a specific portion of a solar 
project's output and receive payment for the energy produced per month or year by it (CSE, 
2015, p. 7). A customer’s respective utility has a separate agreement with the solar developer 
that enables them to receive the selected arrays output and credit the customer’s bill with the 
energy produced from the portion of the array they purchased for however long a period the 
customer-developer agreement specifies. Though both programs were established in 2013, they 
were not approved by the CPUC until February of 2015 (CSE, 2015, p. 11). As of June 2016 the 
CPUC website states that both programs are still in their implementation phases. Despite this, 
the GTSR and ECR are innovative yet simple programs that will grant more households access 
to the environmental and economic benefits of off-site solar energy generation. 
 
Benefits of Policies and Programs 
 
Similar to the UK, California has gained a number of benefits24 as a result of policies and 
programs that aim to increase solar deployment in low-to-moderate income communities. As of 
June 8th 2016, the California Solar Initiative has provided funding for the installation of just 
over 4,100 megawatts of solar projects25, a figure that surpasses the initial 1,940 megawatt goal 
of the program (State of California, 2016). Furthermore, in 2014 two-thirds of on-site solar 
 
 
23 SB 43 mandates that 100 MW of the GTSR shared solar capacity must be located within the top 20 percent of 
areas identified as being disproportionately affect by environmental pollution, environmental degradation or 
socioeconomic vulnerability (CSE, 2015a)  
24 Navigant consulting developed a list of non-energy benefits that was used in their evaluation of CSI’s SASH and  
MASH programs. The entire list can be found in Appendix  
25 Solar projects procured with CSI funding account for approximately 31 percent of the state total installed solar 
capacity (State of California 2016; SEIA, 2016). 
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projects did not receive funding from any CSI sub-programs and most were installed in 
residential communities (Bichkoff et al., 2015 p. 26). The willingness of Californian’s to engage 
with solar technology when funds for the program setup specifically for that purpose were 
temporarily exhausted, is a good sign that the state will eventually achieve its goal of creating a 
self-sustaining industry that is accessible to both the residential and commercial sectors. 
Relatedly, the surge of solar deployment driven by CSI, NSHP, GTSR and ECR programs has 
had a positive impact on the costs per watt for solar generated energy. According to CEC and 
CPUC, the price of solar energy across all sectors has dropped 43 percent from $10.56 per watt 
in 2007 to $4.57 per watt in 2015 (State of California, 2016). A GTM research report partially 
attributes the drastic drop in the price of solar in California to the strong level of residential 
uptake in the state (Roselund, 2016). The report goes on to predict that the continued 
integration of solar will push the technology to reach grid parity in 22 states by 2020 (Roselund, 
2016). Since grid parity is the ultimate end goal for solar integration on a global scale and the 
reality of achieving it does partially depend on steady residential uptake, it becomes paramount 
for other regions like Ontario to take lessons from California’s successes. 
 
In particular, the Single-family Affordable Solar Homes and Multi-family Solar Housing 
programs have contributed greatly to California’s solar-driven environmental, economic and 
social successes. As figure 5.4 shows between 2011 and 2013, the SASH and MASH programs 
reduced GHG emissions by 10, 922 tons and 27, 452 tons respectively (Navigant Consulting, 
2015a). 
 
Program  Year GHG Reduction (tons 
   CO2) 
    
SASH  2011 618 
    
  2012 3,663 
    
  2013 6,641 
    
MASH  2011 2,857 
    
  2012 10,261 
    
  2013 14,334 
    
 TOTAL 38,374 
     
Source: (Navigant Consulting 2015a) 
 
Figure 5.4– The above table summarizes total GHG emission savings resulting from the deployment 
of solar photovoltaics systems entirely or partially funded by the SASH and MASH programs. 
 
The reduction of GHG emissions is closely linked to a decline in peak demand that was 
estimated by Navigant Consulting to have dropped by 13,859 kilowatts in 2013 as a result of the 
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installed capacity of both CSI affordable housing-specific programs (Navigant Consulting, 
2015a, p. xiv). In terms of monetary savings, SASH participants on average saved $876 USD 
annually between 2011 and 2013; for the same time period, the average savings for a tenant with 
virtual net metering participating in the MASH program was $484 USD a year (Navigant 
Consulting, 2015a, p. 65). 71 percent of SASH program participants have an income less than 
$40,000 a year (Navigant Consulting, 2015b, p. 37). As is the case in the United Kingdom, the 
savings resulting from solar integration with affordable housing provide greater financial 
stability to low-to-moderate income households. Additionally, one interviewed building owner 
highlighted that along with saving households money, the MASH program also safeguards 
tenants from rent increases initiated by price spikes in the energy market (Navigant Consulting, 
2015b, p. xxii). 
 
Moreover, as administrator of the SASH program, GRID Alternatives regularly 
facilitates outreach between initial adopters of the SASH program and residents in their 
community to increase participation (GRID Alternatives, 2016, p. 9). The trust-based marketing 
strategy is necessary in low-income communities that can sometimes be skeptical of government 
programs that seem too good to be true. GRID Alternatives also requires each sub-contracted 
installation to have at least one paid trainee - typically from the surrounding community - on-
site, learning from the licensed professionals (GRID Alternatives, 2016, p. 4). This requirement 
has resulted in the growth of skilled labour sourced from low-income communities, which 
subsequently contributes to the upward socioeconomic mobility of low-income households by 
making them employable in California’s lucrative solar market sector (GRID Alternatives, 2016, 
p. 4). 
 
 
As the part of the evaluation phase, a survey conducted by Navigant Consulting was 
issued to SASH and MASH program participants. When asked what the top benefit of the 
initiative were, over 60 percent selected ‘reduced utility bills’ or ‘environmental benefits’ as their 
top choice (Navigant Consulting, 2015a, p. xiii). Additionally, 65 percent of participants 
responding to the survey noted that they had adopted new energy efficiency behaviours as a 
result of having a residential solar energy system; half of MASH respondents made similar 
energy efficiency behavioural changes (Navigant Consulting, 2011b, p. 4; Navigant Consulting, 
2015b, p. xix). Urban energy researcher James Keirstead notes that on-site generation projects 
often illicit this change in energy consumer behaviour since the process of procuring a 
renewable energy system influences them to be more cognizant of the impacts of their energy 
use, thereby inspiring demand management (2007, p.4129). Furthermore, 86 percent of 
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surveyed tenant MASH program participants stated that if they were to move to another 
building, they would encourage their new property manager to participate in the initiative 
(Navigant Consulting, 2015b, p. xxii). This detail about the majority of participants endorsing 
solar integration in any housing they live in illustrates the ultimate benefit of any domestic solar 
integration initiative: influencing low-income households to recognize and educate others about 
the environmental, economic and social benefits that stem from the integration of solar energy 
with affordable housing. 
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CHAPTER 6: Increasing the Potential for Solar-
Equipped Green Affordable Housing in Toronto 
 
6.1: Introduction 
 
The examination of domestic solar integration programs in two socio-political contexts 
similar to Ontario’s offer a number of lessons to be put to use in the province’s capital city. Since 
adopting its Climate Change Action Plan in 2007, the City of Toronto has continuously sought to 
green facilities it owns and operates. In total, the action plan set aside $42 million dollars for 
energy retrofits and renewable energy projects located on City facilities (Climate Change Action 
Plan, 2007). However, discussion of domestic energy efficiency was absent from the plan with 
the exception of a brief mention about the creation of a framework for the Towerwise initiative 
which focused on renewing high-rise residential buildings. More recently, the City has made an 
effort to link households to energy efficiency services with initiatives such as the Home Energy 
Loan Program (HELP) which began in 2014. The recent municipal engagement with residential 
energy efficiency is a necessary next step that must be taken in order to successfully achieve 
carbon emission reduction targets outlined in the 2007 Action Plan26. 
 
Similar to other urban centers, Toronto is home to a large portion of low and moderate 
income individuals and families that like everyone else desire access to tools and services that 
make living in the city healthy and affordable. Therefore, it is incredibly important that Toronto 
enhances the energy efficiency of rental housing in both its public and private forms since the 
result is significant to both decarbonization and socioeconomic equity goals. With a median 
income of $14,930, low-income Torontonians cannot afford the average private market 1-
bedroom rental unit at $1,110 a month, illustrating the necessity of not only lowering the 
operational costs of private market dwellings but more importantly increasing the amount of 
habitable social housing units (RentSeeker Inc., 2016; Mangione, 2015). Over the long-run, 
improving energy efficiency in existing social housing complexes will save funds that can be 
used to develop additional social housing by providers such as the Toronto Community Housing 
Corporation (TCHC). In order to become “the most sustainable city in North America” (City of 
Toronto, 2016), Toronto will have to offer those with the lowest incomes access to energy 
efficient materials and technologies that go hand in hand with creating a regional eco-identity. 
 
 
26 The City of Toronto aims to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from 1990 levels by 30 percent by 2020 and 
80 percent by 2050. 
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Residential properties operated by TCHC - the largest housing provider in the city - are ideal 
places to cultivate a regional eco-identity that is not exclusive. 
 
Created by the City of Toronto on January 1st, 2002, TCHC has a mandate to provide 
safe and affordable quality housing for low and moderate income households (TCHC, 2016). The 
Corporation maintains 2,100 buildings for 110,000 residents, 75 percent of which make less 
than $20,000 a year (TCHC, 2014). The majority of buildings are over 50 years old and 
collectively require upwards of $2.6 billion in repairs (TCHC, 2014, p. 12). The Toronto 
Community Housing 2014 Annual report revealed that one-third of the necessary funds had 
been secured, but federal and provincial contributions for the remaining two-thirds is needed. 
The most frequent repair requests are for plumbing, door and electrical issues, which have 
major impacts on the quality of life experienced by residents (TCHC, 2014, p. 19). 
 
The rent for TCHC tenants includes utilities and is capped at a certain rate, however the 
utility rates that TCHC pays have no corresponding cap (TCHC, 2009, p. 3). Provincial 
legislation mandates that social housing providers cannot share higher costs for energy with 
tenants (Côté, 2013, p. 6). Consequently, as utility rates have risen in tandem with the age of the 
buildings, Toronto Community Housing has had to allocate a larger portion of their budget to 
energy consumed by residents (TCHC, 2009, p. 3; Canadian Centre for Economic Analysis, 
2015, p. 55). In addition to the monetary costs of aged and inefficient TCHC residences, many of 
the older apartment towers constructed in the mid- to late 20th century are some of the largest 
contributors to residential greenhouse gas emissions27 (Stewart and Thorne, 2009). One 
solution to the related issues of increased residential energy costs and high residential GHG 
emissions acknowledged by Toronto Community Housing in a 2009 report is the integration of 
solar energy with existing buildings (TCHC, 2009, p. 4). This chapter will examine past and 
present energy efficiency programs in Toronto that endorse the use of solar energy technology 
and subsequently analyze what lessons they can take from similar programs in the United 
Kingdom and California. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
27 Compared to a single detached house, apartment towers constructed between 1945 and 1984 require 25 
percent more energy per square meter for operation. (Canadian Centre for Economic Analysis, 2015). 
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6.2: Past and Present Energy Efficiency and 
Domestic Solar Integration Programs in Toronto 
 
The Social Housing Renovation and Retrofit Program and the Building 
Energy Retrofit Program 
 
The Social Housing Renovation and Retrofit Program (SHRRP) was a capital grant 
program initiated in 2009 that required $704 million to be spent on rehabilitating certain social 
housing complexes in Ontario by 2011 (Government of Ontario, 2009, p. 2). Funds for the 
program originated from the federal and provincial governments who both contributed $352 
million (Tsenkova, 2013, p. 36). Each of the provinces 47 municipal service managers received 
funding relative to the number of social housing units within their service area; in total the City 
of Toronto received $259 million (Tsenkova, 2013, p. 41). Service managers allocated funds to 
cooperatives and housing providers who utilized it to complete capital repairs that improved the 
energy efficiency of social housing units in the city (Tsenkova, 2013, p. 37). In particular, 
Toronto Community Housing used a portion of the $150 million it received to carry out an 
initiative called the Building Energy Retrofit Program (BERP) (Tsenkova, 2013, p. 41; City of 
Toronto, 2012, p. 2). Beginning on August 7th, 2009, the BERP was run by TCHC in partnership 
with the energy services company Ameresco (TCHC, 2009). The program facilitated energy 
efficiency upgrades such as fluorescent lighting in common areas and units, replacement of hot 
water boilers, roof waterproofing, HVAC upgrades, window refurbishments, building envelope 
repairs and the installation of energy-saving automation systems (TCHC, 2009; Gee and 
Chiappetta, 2012, p. 5). Additionally the program provided energy education, retrofit training 
and mentorship opportunities for tenants of Toronto Community Housing that gave them 
employable skills (TCHC, 2009). 
 
Ameresco was responsible for administrating the BERP in 20 TCHC communities with 
social housing units in low, mid or high-rise structures (City of Toronto, 2012, p. 2). By the end 
of 2012, $40 million originating from the SHRRP fund was used by the Building Energy Retrofit 
Program to upgrade 6,158 units and simultaneously create 400 direct jobs (City of Toronto, 
2012, p. 2). A 2012 City of Toronto staff report hypothesized that the BERP upgrades to Toronto 
Community Housing properties will annually save $1 million as a result of improved efficiency 
from the implemented measures and reduced overall consumption as a result of tenants being 
educated about the impacts of their energy use (City of Toronto, 2012, p. 2). Overall, the SHRRP 
funds contributed to the renovation of over 58,000 social housing units in Toronto (Tsenkova, 
2013, p. 38). 
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The Renewable Energy Initiative 
 
Another program that provided funding for energy retrofits in Toronto was the 
Renewable Energy Initiative (REI). The REI was launched in 2010 and jointly funded by the 
federal and provincial governments. The program delivered one-time funding to housing 
providers installing renewable energy technologies that heat, cool or generate electricity for 
social housing complexes28 (Tsenkova, 2013, p. 38). Since Toronto has a large portion of the 
province's social housing, the city received $30,672,243 of REI funds (City of Toronto, 2010, p. 
2). Toronto Community Housing received nearly 70 percent of REI funds allocated to the city 
that went toward the development of 59 renewable energy projects; the other 40 percent of 
funding was used by other non-profit and cooperative housing providers for the development of 
33 projects (Tsenkova, 2013, p. 40). Figure 6.1 illustrates one of two notable SolarWall© 
projects completed on TCHC buildings in Moss Park on Shuter Street. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Source: Conserval Engineering, Inc.) 
 
Figure 6.1 - Pictured is a SolarWall© located at 272 Shuter Street in  
Toronto’s Moss Park neighbourhood. The system provides solar heated air 
to residents of the building which reduces the uses of natural gas. 
 
28 The REI program supported investment in rooftop solar photovoltaics systems, solar water heating, solar 
air heating, geothermal and mid-sized wind technologies (City of Toronto, 2010). 
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A SolarWall© is a metal wall overlaid with perforated solar collectors 6 to 12 inches 
from its surface in order to create an air cavity that is heated by the collectors and releases the 
warm air into the buildings through the HVAC system (Tsenkova, 2013, p. 49). This particular 
solar energy system reduces the demand placed on conventional heating systems often sourced 
from natural gas, by generating warm air from the sun and recovering heat from suites through 
the ventilation system. The systems in Moss Park have reduced energy consumption costs by 
$15,000 a year and offset over 85 tonnes of CO2 emissions annually since they became 
operational in 2012 (Tsenkova, 2013, p. 49). Overall, the Renewable Energy Initiative had 
positive energy efficiency impacts for 10,997 separate units in the City of Toronto (Tsenkova, 
2013, p. 41) illustrating the potential for success if more programs promoting green affordable 
housing are created and sustained with funding. 
 
 
Towerwise  
In December of 2014 TCHC and Toronto Atmospheric Fund (TAF) signed an agreement 
to complete energy retrofits for over 1,200 units in seven Toronto Community Housing 
buildings (Leach, 2015). Known as the Towerwise retrofit project, the ongoing initiative has $4.2 
million in funding sourced from loans, grants and utility incentives. The finances of the project 
are organized through an Energy Savings Performance Agreement that requires TAF to provide 
all funding for the upgrades upfront and share the utility costs savings with Toronto Community 
Housing over 10 years (Leach, 2015). The first phase of the initiative required energy-use data to 
be gathered in order to determine what retrofit designs will improve air quality, provide 
temperature control and conserve water and energy in seven TCHC buildings (TCHC, 2016). On 
average, each building is 45 years old and subsequently requires a number of energy efficiency 
upgrades to lower operational costs and improve the quality of living for tenants (TCHC, 2015). 
The Towerwise retrofit project will implement upgrades such as new low-flow bathroom 
hardware, double-glazed windows and high-efficiency refrigerators and lighting (Leach, 2015). 
Toronto Community Housing anticipates using the funds from energy cost savings to further 
support the corporation’s 10-year capital repair plan (TCHC, 2015). When TCHC follows 
through with this action it will serve as an example of the far-reaching positive impacts of 
funding the development of ecologically modern social housing. An informational video released 
by the Toronto Atmospheric Fund in June 2016 details that the retrofit process has begun and 
residents welcome the changes (Toronto Atmospheric Fund, 2016). In addition to improving the 
efficiency of TCHC buildings, the Towerwise retrofit projects seeks to act as an 
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example for other municipalities desiring to upgrade the energy efficiency of affordable housing. 
 
The Home Energy Loan Program and the High-rise Retrofit Improvement Support 
Program 
 
Two additional residential energy efficiency initiatives launched in Toronto in 2014 were 
the Home Energy Loan Program (HELP) and the High-rise Retrofit Improvement Support (Hi-
RIS) Program. Both were pilot programs launched by the City of Toronto in collaboration with 
Toronto Hydro and Enbridge Gas to fill a gap left by the conclusion of federal energy efficiency 
programs like SHRRP and the REI (FCM, 2016). The goal of the HELP and Hi-RIS programs is 
to reduce the amount of emissions in the City originating from existing building stock by 
offering single-family and multi-unit residential owners access to $20 million in funding for 
energy efficiency upgrades (Spears, 2014; Hamilton, 2013). Retrofit processes eligible for 
funding include upgrades to furnaces, water heaters, insulation, windows and drain water heat 
recovery systems29 (Spears, 2014). The process begins with interested single and multi-unit 
homeowners having their homes evaluated by an energy advisor certified by the city who decides 
whether or not the residential structure can benefit from energy efficiency improvements. The 
programs use a Local Improvement Charge30 financing mechanism that mandates all upfront 
costs to be covered by the City of Toronto and paid back by each participating owner. 
Participating single-family homeowners have a five to fifteen year payback period while multi-
unit building owners are allowed five to twenty (Hamilton, 2013). If approved by the energy 
advisor, owners become eligible for a loan from the City with a 2.5 or 4.25 percent interest rate 
depending on the payback period selected (Spears, 2014). Once the upgrades are completed, 
loan payments are added to the property tax bill of participants so if the property is sold during 
the payback period, the new owners become responsible to repay the loan to the City of Toronto 
(City of Toronto, 2016). The HELP and Hi-RIS Program are designed to result in the ideal 
situation in which annual payments of the loans are less than the cost of the energy and water 
that the improvements are saving (Hoicka, 2014, p. 595). 
 
29 The pilot phase of the program did not offer the option of active solar systems for electricity or heat generation 
however they may become eligible HELP technologies in the future.  
30 A Local Improvement Charge (LIC) is a financing mechanism typically used by municipalities to cover the cost of 
constructing local infrastructure such as sidewalks or sewer extensions. The municipality pays outright for the 
upgrades and recoups the costs from special charges put on the property tax bill of households that directly 
benefit from the investment. Provincial regulatory changes in 2012 expanded LIC use to include energy efficiency 
upgrades including renewable energy systems to existing housing. The mechanism poses little to no financial risk 
to the province or the municipalities that implement energy efficient upgrade programs, and overcomes two 
barriers that often discourage homeowners from green retrofits: upfront access to capital and a realistic way to 
pay back loans (Persram, 2013). 
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In early 2016 The Federation of Canadian Municipalities presented the FCM Sustainable 
 
Communities Award to the City’s Toronto’s for both the Home Energy Loan Program and High 
 
Rise Retrofit Improvement Support Program (FCM, 2016). FCM recognized the programs since 
they are the first of their kind in Ontario to use an LIC financing mechanism to support energy 
and water upgrades to privately-owned residential buildings. The HELP has reduced the energy 
used by participating households by 25 percent on average. Relatedly, the Hi-RIS program has 
reduced energy used by participating tenants in buildings by 28 percent (FCM, 2016). In 
addition to lowering energy bills and improve residential comfort, the revenue-neutral programs 
have also reduced annual CO2 emissions by 4,900 tonnes (FCM, 2016), illustrating the 
economic, social and environmental benefits that can result from simply offering equitable 
access to financing for residential ‘greening’. The pilot program will run until December of 2016 
at which point the City of Toronto may decide to offer the program permanently. 
 
6.3: Re-imagining Domestic Solar Integration 
 
Programs in Ontario 
 
 
The analysis of solar integration initiatives in the United Kingdom and California offers a 
number of lessons for similar programs in Ontario. In this section, the components of programs 
in the two case studies regions will be applied to the Ontario context and used to re-imagine 
programs that have ended, are currently ongoing, or are anticipated to be launched in the future. 
 
Ontario’s microFiT program has facilitated the development of over 19,000 small scale 
renewable energy systems generating over 170 MW of predominately solar energy that is fed 
into the grid (McInroy, 2015). In 2013 the Ministry of Energy, the IESO and industry 
professionals collaborated on a proposal to reconfigure the microFiT program into a Net Energy 
Metering (NEM) program by 2018 (Environmental Commissioner of Ontario, 2014, p. 33). Net 
metering refers to the process of monitoring energy use at the site of consumption by comparing 
the output of an at-site energy generation system to the electricity consumed by the household 
(O. Reg 541/05; Environmental Commissioner of Ontario, 2014b, p. 33). Eligible structures with 
generation facilities can reduce their energy costs by exporting surplus energy to the grid for 
credit on their energy bills from their utility provider. A 2016 update issued by the Ministry of 
Energy stated that this reconfiguration will occur and that all applications for the microFiT 
program will no longer be accepted as of December 31st, 2017 in preparation for the re-launch 
(Ministry of Energy, 2016). Though the creation of a dedicated net energy metering program is a 
great way to encourage solar integration and reduced consumption, issues of access to the future 
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initiative have been highlighted. A report published by the City of Toronto stated that unless 
they are financially assisted to participate in renewable integration and net metering programs, 
low income households will be excluded and vulnerable to rising non-renewable energy costs 
(City of Toronto, 2009, p. 6). 
 
In California the CPUC eliminated the potential for this vulnerability by initially offering 
NEM as a sub-program of the Multi-Affordable Solar Housing Initiative. The MASH program 
uses a third-party financing model known as a power purchase agreement (PPA) that requires 
each PPA provider to finance all upfront and system maintenance costs and subsequently sell 
the power produced by a rooftop solar system to each unit on a per kWh basis for an agreed 
upon period (McCutchan et al., 2011, p. i). Since the MASH program targets low-income tenant 
properties, these communities were able to benefit from net energy metering before it became a 
state-wide program accessible to people of all socioeconomic backgrounds. In Ontario, microFiT 
participants typically have higher incomes since these households are able to afford the upfront 
costs of renewable technologies such as rooftop solar photovoltaics. Thus, in order to enhance 
access to Ontario’s microFiT turned NEM program the Ministry of Energy, IESO and leading 
renewable energy industry professionals should entertain the thought of establishing a separate 
MASH-replica program for communities where a portion of residents receive monthly support 
for energy bills from the Ontario Electricity Support Program. Promoting power purchase 
agreements that pair residential renewable energy integration with net energy metering for 
clusters of social, cooperative and private-market rental housing would eliminate the pending 
issue of these communities being excluded from the province-wide decarbonization solution of 
net energy meter. Towerwise resembles a PPA in that the Toronto Atmospheric Fund pays for 
the energy efficiency upgrades and pass on some of the energy savings to Toronto Community 
Housing. Developing a separate program that like MASH pairs the financing of renewable 
energy systems with net energy metering equipment would likely be popular in high density 
regions of Ontario such as Toronto. 
 
Moreover, though the federally and provincial-funded Renewable Energy Initiative was 
successful in lowering operating costs for social housing providers and tenants, it did not reach 
as broad an audience as it could have since it only took place over two years. If the federal and 
provincial government choose to relaunch the program they should take lessons from the 
California Solar Initiative and open the program for a decade, in order to afford it the same 
period of maturity and popularity as Ontario’s FiT program that has gradually reduced tariffs 
over the years but maintains a steady rate of participation. Additionally lengthening the active 
period of REI 2.0 would allow interested housing providers to organize more residential 
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renewable energy projects and potentially develop economies of scale that give more low-income 
Ontarians access to clean energy. Toward the end of the ten-year Renewable Energy Initiative 
2.0 as funding nears depletion, similar to the extension of the SASH program, third-party 
participation by utilities such as Enbridge Gas who will be faced with rising Cap and Trade rates 
should be endorsed by both senior levels of government. In such a scenario a smaller portion of 
REI 2.0 funds would be presented to cover the costs of the development phase of projects like 
the UK’s Urban Community Energy Fund and the third-party would be responsible for 
construction and maintenance costs for the life of a system. 
 
Creating third-party Power Purchase Agreements or PAYGen31 schemes similar to those 
used in California and the UK between utilities and housing providers will offer the same 
benefits of cash-flow access for upfront costs and consequent energy cost savings to low-income 
Ontario communities. The PAYGen scheme used in the UK in particular would be a good fit in 
Ontario since the general FiT program continues to reduce tariffs, and existing solar developers 
that have traditionally focused on large scale rural ground mounts and commercial rooftop 
projects may show interest in tackling large scale residential solar procurement. Additionally, 
throughout the revamped REI program incentives granted to applicants should vary depending 
on the average income of residents in an affordable housing building or complex. For example, 
the first phase of the SASH program only fully subsidized the cost of solar photovoltaics systems 
installed on homes that had a total household income 50 percent or lower than California’s 
average median income (U.S. Department of Energy, 2016). All households making less than 80 
percent but more than 50 percent of the average median income were only eligible for partial 
subsidization of a system sized to make the home a net zero dwelling (U.S. Department of 
Energy, 2016; Navigant Consulting, 2011). The differences in incentives based on income affords 
those with truly the least means the greatest amount of support in their pursuit of lower energy 
costs, while still offering substantial funding to those that may only be a few paychecks above 
households who are financially strained. 
 
The  province  could  also  adapt  aspects  of  California’s  New  Solar  Homes  Program 
 
(NSHP). Though it has only been implemented as a pilot project, in the future the province may 
formally mandate that all new residential structures must be built solar-ready. A solar-ready 
home refers to a dwelling that is initially built to include the necessary piping and equipment 
 
 
31 A third party company unaffiliated with the licensed electricity providers will install a photovoltaic system or any 
other renewable energy system free of charge. The household receives the energy bill savings that come with at-
site solar generation, and the third party company receives the generation and export tariffs over the lifetime of 
the system (20-25 year for solar photovoltaics) as payment (Saunders et al., 2012, p.80). 
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needed to install a solar energy system (Ontario Green Homes, 2010). When solar-readiness 
becomes a reality for new residential buildings, cooperative, social and purpose-built rental 
housing will require a program like the NSHP that provides a variety of types of homes full or 
partial subsidization for the costs to install the system (CEC, 2015, p. 2). Similar to the re-
imagined REI program, residential building owners can finance the initial purchase and 
installation of the solar PV system using third-party agreements (CESA, 2015, p. 16). 
Additionally, funding could come from the province’s Green Investment Fund (GIF). In April of 
 
2016 the GIF set aside $82 million to be used by social housing providers to complete energy 
retrofits that contribute to provincial decarbonization targets (Ministry of Municipal Affairs, 
2016). The City of Toronto will receive $42.9 million of these funds and allocate them based on a 
competitive application process (Ministry of Municipal Affairs, 2016). Again like REI 2.0, 
participants would receive funding based on the average income of residents of a building or 
complex in order to promote ‘just sustainability’. 
 
Additionally, the new streamlined community renewable energy initiative in Ontario 
could eventually incorporate aspects of the UK’s Urban Community Energy Fund (UCEF). 
Ontario’s Energy Partnerships Program (EPP) consolidated four separate community energy 
programs32 into one in order to improve the ability of various communities and organization to 
develop renewable energy projects on or off-site. The window for the new Energy Partnerships 
Program opened on June 27th, 2016 and provides indigenous communities, cooperatives, 
municipalities and public sector entities access to funding to develop energy projects (IESO, 
2016). Similar to the UCEF program, funds are distributed exclusively for the development 
phase of community renewable energy projects. In the context of Ontario, the development 
phase of these projects encompasses a majority of the legal, technical and financial due-
diligence and costs that precede the submission of applications to the FiT or Large Renewable 
Procurement programs. Presently the Energy Partnerships Program will be accessible to groups 
regardless of their average income. In the future the program could adapt a premium similar the 
UCEF which requires successfully implemented projects that generate a profit to repay the 
issued loan with a premium; the premium funds would then be used to expand access of the 
program to more communities (DECC, 2014, p. 4). It is important to note that the EPP program 
is a grant program, and participants are not expected to repay the IESO. However, a re-
imagined EPP would have both a grant and loan stream, with the latter ideally mandating a 
 
32 the Energy Partnerships Program (EPP) that consolidates the Community Energy Partnerships Program, the 
Municipal and Public Sector Energy Partnerships Program, the Aboriginal Renewable Energy Fund, and the 
Aboriginal Transmission Fund into one (MaRS, 2010; IESO, 2016) 
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premium for projects that will mainly benefit households classified as anything other than low-
to-moderate income. Like the UCEF the premium would only be imposed if the project is 
successfully executed. All premium funds would be used specifically for renewable energy 
projects that benefit low-to moderate income Ontarians. 
 
Furthermore, in the future the EPP could also adapt aspects of California’s Green Tariff 
 
Shared Renewables Program (GTSR) that emphasize the importance of the participation of low-
income communities in decarbonization programs. The GTSR is an innovative solar share 
program that allows Californian’s living in structures unsuitable for on-site renewable systems 
to apply for a green rate offered by their utility which enables them to have 50 to 100 percent of 
their electrical load sourced from off-site renewable electrical generation facilities (CSE, 2015, p. 
7). The program stipulates that 100 MW of the 600 MW cap for the two California solar shares 
programs33 must be located in environmentally or socio-economically disadvantages 
communities in order to provide residents that live there access to the economic, social and 
environmental benefits of solar energy systems (Sen. Bill 43, 2013; CSE, 2015, p. 13). Since the 
EPP does not have the ability to mandating a portion of MW for low-to-moderate income 
communities, instead it could establish that a certain portion of total funding must be used to 
assist in the development of renewable energy projects in regions of the province with the least 
means. 
 
Ultimately, active and archived domestic solar integration programs in Ontario should 
be habitually evaluated and analyzed in order to identify how they can further be innovated to 
reflect both ecologically-modern ideology and ‘just sustainability’. Successfully innovating 
programs that pairs these two ideologies together would reflect a provincial mindset that green 
housing and affordable housing are not, and should not be treated as mutually exclusive 
concepts in the 21st century. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
33 The second California solar Share program is the Enhanced Community Renewables (ECR) program. 
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6.4: Potential Residential Solar Energy System 
 
Locations in Toronto 
 
In addition to re-imagining programs in the province that encourage a relationship 
between solar energy systems and affordable housing, it is beneficial to think through where 
potential projects should be located. Toronto Community Housing owns and operates 63 
percent of the social housing stock in the most populous city in Ontario (Tsenkova, 2013). If 
solar energy systems were successfully integrated with a large portion of residential properties 
owned by the most well-known housing provider in Ontario, it is not far-fetched to imagine that 
housing providers elsewhere in the province would follow suit. 
 
In order to identify potential locations for residential solar energy systems on Toronto 
Community Housing-owned buildings, several factors were examined. The first, pictured in 
Figure 6.2 is the density of TCHC Rent-Geared-to-Income (RGI) units in each Toronto 
Neighbourhood34. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.2 - A map of Toronto’s 140 neighbourhoods illustrating the density of Toronto Community Housing 
rent-geared-to-income units in each. 
 
34 The Data set used to illustrate density only summarizes RGI data for TCHC properties with six or more units 
in 2013. (TCHC, 2013) 
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Figure 6.3 – The image outlines the boundaries of Moss Park, the Toronto neighbourhood with the 
highest density of RGI units in Toronto. Also pictured are the location of two SolarWall© systems on 
Toronto Community Housing high-rise buildings at 275 and 295 Shuter Street. 
 
Moss Park (outlined in Figure 6.3), has the highest density of RGI units in TCHC properties 
at 2,324 (TCHC, 2013). The neighbourhood is also home to SolarWall© projects located on 275 
and 295 Shuter Street also identified in Figure 6.2. Since the SolarWall© projects were 
developed with REI funding that had to be spent within a certain time frame, Moss Park was 
likely selected since the systems would benefit so many TCHC households. Collectively, the two 
buildings have 600 RGI units combined. Ideally, this should be the mindset for Toronto 
Community Housing when they develop new residentially integrated solar energy systems in 
order to offer as many low-income residents the benefits experienced by civilians with similar 
socioeconomic status in the United Kingdom and California. As such, RGI unit density is one 
factor that should inform the selection of future solar energy system sites on Toronto 
Community Housing properties. 
 
A second characteristic examined was the age of Toronto Community Housing 
properties. The majority of residences with existing RGI units were built in the 1950’s and 
1960’s. In fact, over 100 separate TCHC properties were built in 1962 alone (TCHC, 2016). 
Existing microFiT solar energy systems on Toronto Community Housing Properties pictured in 
Figure 6.4 are predominantly located on residences built less than 60 years ago, alluding to the 
corporation’s preference for placing systems on structure of this age. It is safe to assume that 
TCHC rationalizes a building-age cut-off point for residentially integrated solar projects since 
 
75 
older buildings are more likely to require a number of structural repairs such as plumbing, roof 
or electrical improvements before they are suitable for on-site renewable energy systems. 
Furthermore, properties 60 year or older – such as the original 1949 Regent Park complex - are 
more likely to be entirely redeveloped during the 20 year microFiT contract period. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.4 – The pictured map highlights the location of existing solar energy systems on TCHC and 
City of Toronto-owned buildings. The marked Toronto Community housing microFiT systems range in size 
from 1 to 140 kW AC and were connected to the grid between June of 2010 and September of 2014. 
 
Combining the requirements of high RGI unit density35 and buildings no older than 60 
years, produces the twelve Toronto neighbourhoods shown in Figure 6.5. With total RGI 
densities ranging from 445 to 1,803 these neighbourhoods are home to a sizeable portion of 
Toronto Community Housing residents in high-rises, townhouse multiplexes and mid-rise 
apartments all built in the second half of the 20th century. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
35 For the purpose of this cartographic analysis, a neighbourhoods was considered to have high RGI unit density if 
it had more than 410 units in its borders. 
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Figure 6.5 – In red are the twelve Toronto neighbourhoods with more than 410 RGI units in buildings built 
less than 60 years ago. 
 
In order to narrow in further on ideal locations for residential solar energy systems, 
twelve neighbourhoods that adhered to the density and age criteria were cross referenced with 
the City of Toronto’s Neighbourhood Improvement Areas in order to determine which regions 
suffers from the highest levels of housing unaffordability. Figure 6.6 identifies the location of the 
31 Neighbourhood Improvement Areas (NIAs) established by the City of Toronto in 2014. 
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Figure 6.6 – The map highlights in orange the 31 Neighbourhood Improvement Areas identified by 
the City of Toronto in 2014. 
 
As part of the ‘Toronto Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy 2020’, the city analyzed all 140 
neighbourhoods and those that failed to meet the Neighbourhood Equity score were classified as 
NIAs (City of Toronto, 2016). The measure scores each neighbourhood out of 100 points; the 
lower the score, the higher the level of inequalities present in the neighbourhood (Ontario 
Energy Board, 2015). The scores for each neighbourhood varied depending on the presence, 
absence and intensity of fifteen indicators that examined residents’ economic opportunities, 
social development, participation in decision-making, quality of physical surroundings and 
health (City of Toronto, 2014 March). Neighbourhoods with scores lower than the equity 
benchmark (42.89) were identified as needing immediate action and subsequently designated 
NIAs. Six of the twelve neighbourhoods (pictured in Figure 6.7) previously identified in figure 
6.5 were recognized by the City of Toronto as Neighbourhood Improvement Areas in 2014. 
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Figure 6.7 - The map highlights in purple the six Toronto Neighbourhood Improvement Areas with high 
RGI density built less than 60 years ago. 
 
The City of Toronto has created an NIA profile for each of the neighbourhoods outlining the 
details of their equity scores along with housing and demographic information. Figure 6.8 
summarizes several of the measurements from each neighbourhood profile in order to further 
develop clarity about where potential residential solar energy systems should be located. 
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Neighbourhood Total % of Percent of # of RGI 
 Population Population Population in Units* 
 (2011) Spending 30 Low-Income  
  percent or (after tax)  
  more of   
  household   
  income on   
  shelter costs   
Mount Olive- 32,788 38% 27% 983 
Silverstone-     
Jamestown     
Black Creek 22,057 34% 28% 1424 
Weston 18,170 42% 24% 704 
Rustic 9,951 29% 25% 724 
Scarborough Village 16,609 42% 33% 566 
West Hill 26,547 29% 24% 1803  
Source: City of Toronto, 2014 
*Number of RGI is based on a 2013 City of Toronto data that only compiled data for TCHC properties with 6 or more units. 
 
Figure 6.8 – The table summarizes statistics taken from the neighbourhood profiles for each of the six 
neighbourhoods. Though Black Creek and West Hill have the greatest amount of RGI units, the Mount-
Olive-Silverstone-Jamestown, Weston and Scarborough Village neighbourhoods have more households 
living in unaffordable housing. 
 
With relatively similar total and low-income populations, the 6 neighbourhoods can be split into 
two groups when it comes to housing affordability. The Mount Olive-Silverstone-Jamestown, 
Weston and Scarborough Village Neighbourhoods all have over 35 percent of their total 
population spending more than 30 percent of their income on shelter costs. These three 
neighbourhoods were selected as ideal areas to begin to integrate solar energy systems that 
taken advantage of the re-imagined and hypothetical programs discussed in chapter 6.3. 
Subsequently, cluster of TCHC properties in the 3 neighbourhoods were surveyed using satellite 
imagery to identify buildings with substantial solar access that were well suited for on-site solar 
energy generation systems. 
 
One potential site is a Toronto Community Housing complex located southeast of the 
intersection of Silverstone Drive and Mount Olive Drive identified in Figure 6.9. Known as the 
Kipling/Mount Olive development, the complex is composed of fourteen buildings originally 
built in 1967 (TCHC, 2013). The multiplex has 144 rent-geared-to-income units in 2-storey 
townhouses (TCHC, 2013). Collectively the community has over 80,000 square feet of unshaded 
rooftop space that could support multiple solar photovoltaic systems. Moreover, installing net 
metering equipment along with the solar photovoltaic panels could incentivize reduced 
consumption and ultimately result in energy cost savings for Toronto Community Housing. 
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Sources: Esri, DigitalGlobe, GeoEye, i-cubed, USDA FSA, USGS, AEX, Getmapping, Aerogrid, IGN, IGP, swisstopo, and the GIS 
User Community 
 
Figure 6.9 – Toronto Community Housing’s Kipling/Mount Olive Townhouse Multiplex located 
southeast of the intersection of Silverstone Drive and Mount Olive Drive. The development is located 
in Toronto’s Mount Olive-Silverstone-Jamestown neighbourhood. 
 
In turn, the saving could be used to update other components of the Kipling/Mount Olive 
development. Through the re-imagined Renewable Energy Initiative, youth or unemployed 
residents living in the multiplex that are interested in gaining technical skills would be 
partnered with licensed solar contracts and given hands-on education about not only the 
installation but continued maintenance of solar energy systems. 
 
Another potential residential solar energy system could be located in Toronto’s Weston 
neighbourhood on a high-rise apartment building south of the intersection of Weston Road and 
Bellevue Crescent (Figure 6.10). 5 Bellevue Crescent was originally constructed in 1971 and 
contains 325 RGI units (TCHC, 2013). Similar to the high-rise buildings in Moss Park, Bellevue 
has a large southeast facing exterior wall with large brick-only sections. Thus, like Moss Park a 
SolarWall© could be constructed on one or several sections of the wall to provide solar air 
heating to building occupants, subsequently reducing the use of natural gas as a heating source. 
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Sources: Esri, DigitalGlobe, GeoEye, i-cubed, USDA FSA, USGS, AEX, Getmapping, Aerogrid,  
IGN, IGP, swisstopo, and the GIS User Community 
 
Figure 6.10 – Pictured is Toronto Community Housing’s 5 Bellevue 
Crescent property. Locate south of the intersection of Weston Road and 
Bellevue Crescent the high-rise contains 325 RGI units. 
 
Finally, a mid-rise apartment building in the Scarborough Village neighbourhood is well 
suited for a rooftop solar photovoltaic system. Originally constructed in 1965, 3181 Eglinton Ave 
East is a seven-floor apartment building with 103 rent-geared-to-income units (TCHC, 2013). As 
figure 6.11 shows the property has a relatively clear rooftop measuring approximately 23,500 
square feet capable of housing a 150 to 200 kW tilted-array system36. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
36 The 200 kW estimate was derived from comparing the square foot size of an existing 10 kW system on a TCHC 
property. The reference project is located at 30 Denarda Street in Toronto and tilted array occupies approximately 
1000 square feet of the rooftop. 
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Sources: Esri, DigitalGlobe, GeoEye, i-cubed, USDA FSA, USGS, AEX, Getmapping,  
Aerogrid, IGN, IGP, swisstopo, and the GIS User Community 
 
Figure 6.11 – Picture is a mid-rise Toronto Community 
Housing building located at 3181 Eglinton Avenue East. The seven-
floor building has 103 RGI units and a total roof that is 
approximately 23,500 square feet. 
 
Even if programs such as the re-imagined Renewable Energy Initiative become a reality, 
impediments to the successful procurement of residential solar energy systems on the three 
potential sites identified in this chapter are likely to occur, especially issues of grid capacity and 
connectivity. Regardless, it is important to think through how all affordable housing structures 
can adapt energy efficient materials and technologies; doing so has the potential to prompt 
private and non-profit housing providers such as Toronto Community Housing to evaluate the 
potential economic, social and environmental benefits of technologies such as solar. Housing 
provider can subsequently voice an interest in greening the existing residential built form to 
institutions, who ideally would consider the creation of a dedicated program for residential solar 
integration. The idea of housing provider mobilization at the municipal scale will be discussed 
further in the final chapter of the paper along with recommended actions at the provincial levels. 
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Chapter 7: Recommended Actions to Incite Solar-
equipped Green Affordable Housing in Ontario 
 
7.1: Municipal Actions 
 
The six chapters of analysis in this work have revealed a number of actions that should 
take place at either the municipal or provincial level in order to make solar-equipped green 
affordable housing a reality for a larger portion of Ontarians. As the lowest level of government, 
municipalities are responsible for a majority of components that impact the day to day quality of 
life of Ontarians. The paired discussion of energy efficiency and housing affordability has 
revealed the importance of coordinating the parallel evolution of two components of the built 
form that historically have been examined and innovated independently. Based on the 
discussion that has taken place in this work, the following actions are recommended to be taken 
by all municipal governments in Ontario. 
 
1) Offer administrative and technical support to non-profit and private housing 
providers who wish to evaluate the qualitative and quantitative feasibility of 
integrating solar energy systems with suitable properties. 
 
Municipalities have a responsibility to play a part in rectifying the current unequal 
distribution of solar decarbonization technologies among socioeconomic classes. In order to 
achieve a reality of equitable distribution of reduced energy costs, GHG emissions and improved 
comfort of dwellings, cost-benefit and non-energy benefit analyses need to be completed by 
housing providers and owners to gauge where systems can be placed to create the largest 
impact. The municipal action of assisting housing providers and owners with solar suitability 
analysis was inspired by the federal 1998 home energy audit program37. The program offered 
free energy audits across Canada and focused on targeting housing built earlier than 1980 
(Gamtessa, 2013, p. 157). The energy audits were performed by independent professionals 
certified by the Office of Energy Efficiency, who were obligated to provide residential property 
owners detailed information about the ideal energy efficiency improvements they should make 
to the dwelling in order to achieve a higher EnerGuide for Homes rating (Gamtessa, 2013, p. 
 
 
 
37 The home energy audit program was known formally as the EnerGuide for Homes initiative. It was developed by 
the Office of Energy Efficiency of Natural Resources Canada in cooperation with Canada Mortgage and Housing 
Corporation. The goal of the program was to reduce greenhouse gas emissions through investment in upgrades 
that improved the energy efficiency of the building envelope, windows, doors, heating systems and hot water 
systems (Hoicka, 2014). 
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157). In order to incite residential solar adoption, the home energy audit program should be 
revived and reconfigured at the municipal level. 
 
The municipal adaptation of the program would require auditors to be certified by a city 
planning department and a specific section of their report would assess the technical feasibility 
of integrating solar technology with the dwelling. Moreover, in order to offer the program at no 
cost to housing providers, auditors would be paid from a city Decarbonization Strategies Trust 
derived from funds permitted by zoning by-law to be given to the city by private developers 
seeking height or density bonuses. Each municipalities’ ‘bonusing’ by-law38 would include 
 
‘decarbonization strategies’ as an eligible matter that private developers would financially 
contribute to in exchange for municipal authorization of increases in height and density that are 
otherwise unpermitted by the zoning by-law. With this free technical feedback from certified 
auditors, housing providers could assess feasibility and arrive at a decision (after consulting 
with residents), to declare an interest in procuring a solar energy system to their governing 
municipality. If Ontario continues to lack a provincial program dedicated to financially assisting 
affordable housing providers with solar integration projects, municipalities should connect 
housing providers with third party solar developers interested in forming community energy 
partnerships and utilizing the IESO Energy Partnerships Program. The municipal action of 
simultaneously offering housing providers support for energy efficiency improvement analysis 
and mandating inclusionary zoning would certainly result in considerable progress to be made 
on decarbonization targets and affordable housing availability goals. 
 
2) Compile details of residential community interest in solar integration programs 
and advocate the demand for funding programs to the provincial government. 
 
As entities responsible for the provision of affordable housing, municipalities have a 
vested interested in physical changes to dwellings that improve the quality of life experienced by 
residents. In order to prevent future instances of Ontario dwellings degrading and consequently 
lowering the quality of life of occupants, affordable housing and sustainable housing must 
become synonymous concepts. Solar-powered green affordable housing is one of many ways to 
create a link between the two concepts, but in order for it to become a reality, dedicated funding 
programs that offer grants, loans or both must exist. In order to advocate a need for these 
programs by residents in their jurisdiction, municipalities should summarize details of feasible 
residential solar integration projects. 
 
38 Section 37 of Ontario’s Planning Act states “The council of a local municipality may, in a by-law passed under 
section 34, authorize increases in the height and density of development otherwise permitted by the by-law that 
will be permitted in return for the provision of such facilities, services or matters as are set out in the by-law.” 
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To attract the attention of the provincial government, municipalities should unite 
through the existing CHEERIO initiative and compile a database of potential sites for residential 
solar integration projects. The Collaboration on Home Energy Efficiency in Ontario39 
(CHEERIO) is an initiative launched in 2012 with over twenty municipalities as members. The 
members seek to develop a multi-municipality pilot40 that analyzes the effectiveness of the 
Local Improvement Charge (LIC) in accelerating residential energy retrofits on single and multi-
unit dwellings (Clean Air Partnership, n.d.). The identification of properties suited for solar 
technology, among other energy efficiency measures, aligns with the objectives of CHEERIO. 
Therefore, action should be taken by current member municipalities to develop a database of 
potential sites for energy retrofits. The creation of a ‘potential site’ database through CHEERIO 
would oblige the province to acknowledge a union of municipalities that have identified the need 
for residential energy retrofits at specific locations. Ideally, the province would be inclined to 
provide funding while also requesting federal contributions to facilitate the launch of programs 
that administratively and financially resemble the former REI, the UK’s Renewable Heat 
Initiative and the collection of California Solar Initiative programs that facilitate solar 
procurement in low-to-moderate income communities. 
 
7.2: Provincial Actions 
 
Managing over 40 percent of Canada’s total population, the Government of Ontario has a 
duty to diffuse ideas with actions that improve the livability and global reputation of the region. 
One such idea is the treatment of sustainability and affordability as equally important factors in 
decarbonization strategies. The following actions are recommended to be taken by the 
Government of Ontario. 
 
1) Clear articulation of the benefits stemming from a relationship between 
renewable energy systems and the construction and redevelopment of 
affordable housing. 
 
The full environmental, economic and social potential of solar energy technology cannot 
be realized without detailed policy and programs in place that incentivize engagement with 
these technologies by people of all socioeconomic backgrounds living a variety of dwellings. The 
idea of coordinating energy and housing is not lost on the Government of Ontario, which has 
 
39 CHEERIO is administrated by both Toronto Atmospheric Fund and the Clean Air Partnership and receives funding 
from federal, provincial and private entities  
40 The Toronto Home Energy Loan Program (HELP) is the first of several initiatives anticipated to be launched to 
evaluate the effectiveness of the LIC in accelerating residential energy retrofits in Ontario. 
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articulated in several documents the importance of bridging sustainable practices and housing. 
The Housing Service Act outlines that the interests of the province are furthered by housing 
 
“delivered in a manner that promotes environmental sustainability and energy conservation” 
 
(Housing Services Acts, R.S.O. 2011). Additionally, the Ontario Housing Policy Statement 
acknowledges that across the province, there is an “increased awareness of the importance of 
developing sustainable and energy efficient housing” and the province strives to be a leader in 
renewable energy procurement and green job creation (Government of Ontario, n.d., p. 7-8). 
 
Thus, it is recognized that the action of articulating the positive relationship that can 
exist between renewable energy and affordable housing has partially been taken by the 
provincial government. However, the next phase of this action requires the province to 
emphasize the importance of integrating all existing housing along with newly developed 
residences with energy efficiency technology. Put another way, it is important to be forward 
thinking about the future development of newly constructed sustainable, energy efficient 
housing; but it is even more important to pull existing housing into the future with technology 
located at the site of residential consumption. The action of endorsing integration of 
decarbonization materials and technologies with existing housing ideally will contribute to the 
creation of a society where innovation and integration of green practices and technologies 
inspires a total reconfiguration of short-sighted, and harmful practices like fossil fuel 
dependence. 
 
2) The creation of a residential solar-integration initiative that identifies 
affordable housing properties as target sites and has clear participation, 
installed capacity and emission reduction targets. 
 
Affordable housing is extremely important to the evolution of the socioeconomic culture 
of urbanizing regions like Ontario. Programs that facilitate the incorporation of solar energy 
technology with affordable housing can facilitate the continued evolution of Ontario’s 
socioeconomic culture. This evolution would move the province in a direction where processes 
of development are increasingly driven by public support that is subsequently mobilized by an 
identity that places environmental health and socioeconomic equity ahead of initial monetary 
costs. Additionally, creating programs that facilitate the integration of solar energy systems with 
affordable housing ensures that residents do not have to wait for the technology to trickle down 
to their communities. The provincial government should finance and administer a residential-
solar integration initiative with a similar format as the California Solar Initiative that has an 
overarching installed capacity goal and participation targets for sub-programs that differ based 
on the type of dwelling, type of solar technology and whether the system is located on or off-site. 
A certain portion of total initiative funds should be set aside for households currently 
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eligible for the funding from the Ontario Electricity Support Program. Similar to the MASH 
program, multi-unit buildings operated by non-profit or private housing providers would be 
eligible to receive incentives for solar-generated energy that offsets the common areas load as 
well as net-metered individual unit electrical loads. 
 
A regionally-administered residential solar integration initiative offers a host of potential 
benefits to Ontarians currently experienced by residents in the United Kingdom and California. 
As a decarbonization strategy, solar energy system integration reduces reliance on non-
renewable sources of energy that release emissions, and in the near future will cost consumers 
more money when the Cap and Trade program is introduced. Another benefit made particularly 
clear by the UK case study is that the existence of energy-efficient affordable housing reduces 
the risk of energy poverty among low-income households by lowering energy costs, and reducing 
reliance on emergency energy funds like the OESP. Additionally, the efficient operation of solar 
technology is highly dependent on the integrity of the structure on which it sits. Therefore, 
integrating solar energy systems with affordable housing can positively influence housing 
providers to perform regular maintenance on their properties, which slowly eliminates the 
notion of rundown affordable housing in the province. Moreover, an Ontario residential solar 
initiative that mandates resident mentorships with licensed solar contractors like the SASH 
program will produce the economic benefit of providing residents the opportunity to gain labour 
skills that subsequently enhance their employability. 
 
Along with the economic benefits, solar-powered green affordable housing inspires 
positive social change in the surrounding community as a result of emphasis being placed on 
environmental values. One particular change noted by James Keirstead is that on-site 
generation projects often illicit a change in energy consumer behaviour since the process of 
procuring a renewable energy system influences many residents to be more cognisant of the 
impacts of their energy consumption (2007, p.4129). Becoming aware of the environmental and 
economic impacts of individual consumption contributes to the materialization of an eco-
identity that becomes embedded in a community when multiple households possess it. 
Relatedly, well-maintained solar-powered green affordable housing positively influences the 
community to take more pride in where they live. Changing the attitudes of residents in social, 
private market and co-op housing in Ontario can influence individuals in other regions to hold 
affordable housing in higher-esteem, subsequently peeling back the layers of negativity often 
attached to low-income households and their communities. Also, the California case study 
revealed that even when solar-powered households move they are inclined to recreate all the 
benefits by educating and encouraging their new housing providers to procure residential solar 
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energy systems. Ultimately, the creation of a residential solar integration initiative by the 
provincial government is an important and worthwhile undertaking that would contribute to the 
achievement of three inextricably linked notions: environmental health, inter-generational 
equity and intra-generational equity. 
 
3) Continue to fund research examining how Ontario’s energy system can 
efficiently adapt green technologies like solar energy systems and storage 
technology. 
 
It is important that Ontario’s existing energy system is capable of adapting green 
technology innovations of the present and the future. In the past, Ontario’s Renewable Energy 
 
Standard Offer Program (RESOP) had a high participation rate, but operation of solar 
photovoltaic systems was slowed by transmission issues two years into the program in 2008 
(OSEA, 2011). Consistent funding of research examining how the province’s energy system can 
efficiently adapt green technological innovations is central to ensuring that the system rigidity 
associated with centralized energy generation does not stand in the way of energy innovations 
that are decentralized. For example, energy storage technology will in the coming decades 
become more mainstream41 since it improves the practicality of renewable technologies such as 
solar that contribute to decarbonization targets. It is important that the provincial energy 
system is able to adapt the technology without major delays due to the rigidity of an energy 
system built with centralized production and distribution in mind. Therefore, in addition to 
funding research about future adaptation of green technology this action must be complimented 
by the province making headway on maintaining and innovating the transmission and 
distribution networks. 
 
Together the three recommended provincial actions contribute to the creation of a strong 
region-wide effort that connects processes central to the creation of a stable socioeconomic 
environment for residential solar. The full benefits of solar-powered green affordable housing in 
Ontario can only be realized if educated households and housing providers exist parallel to a 
regional residential program and a government-supported green technology industry that 
obliges them to innovate the existing energy system. Successfully carrying out these actions will 
bring Ontario closer to a reality in which the guaranteed growth of residential development is 
 
41The IESO launched a procurement process for storage technology in the fall of 2014 that resulted in the approval 
of 5 companies for the build-out of 33.54 megawatts of total project capacity (IESO, 2015). This first phase of 
energy storage procurement program is expected to come online before the end of 2016. IESO emphasizes that 
the projects will “optimize the performance of renewable resources by smoothing out natural fluctuations in solar 
and wind production” (IESO, 2015). 
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shadowed by green development practices that make sustainability a lived reality for a majority 
of the population, instead of aloof ideal only achieved by the privileged minority. 
 
7.3: Conclusion 
 
This work has discussed the environmental, social and economic harmonies that result 
from the equitable and sustainable practice of integrating solar technologies with affordable 
housing communities. Through analysis of low-to-moderate income households and residential 
energy consumption in multiple contexts, this paper has emphasized the role solar energy 
generation technology can play in bridging urban planning and energy planning. Solar-equipped 
housing is one of many solutions that ensures that energy affordability, social equity, and 
environmentalism are reflected in affordable housing. Additionally, in order to eliminate the 
socioeconomic exclusivity of green practices, Ontario must become indoctrinated with the idea 
that sustainability and affordability should be treated as equally important factors in 
decarbonization strategies so that eco-identities can materialize anywhere. The deployment of 
solar energy systems is capital-intensive, thus financing support options for low- income 
interested customers are an essential part of ensuring the creation and maintenance of an 
equitable solar market in Ontario. Programs in both case study regions acknowledged this 
reality by offering both grants and low interest finance mechanisms. Furthermore, several of the 
analyzed programs had higher rebate structures for low-income participants in order to make 
the front end economics of solar development work for these households. In order to develop 
solar-powered green affordable housing, the province of Ontario needs to establish similar 
inclusive policies and regulations that allow low-income households to participate in 
decarbonization strategies. 
 
The analyzed programs also emphasized how important good information sharing and 
marketing are to getting low-to-moderate income households to participate. In particular, 
California’s SASH program used a strategy of trust-based marketing that allowed potential 
participants to consult with existing low-to-moderate income solar adopters in order to see 
firsthand the benefits of residential solar energy system integration (GRID Alternatives, 2016, p. 
9). The ideal scenario is the creation of policy and programs that spawn satisfied participants 
who advocate the benefits to others. This contributes to processes of decarbonization being 
valued and implemented in communities where improving the energy efficiency of housing 
benefits those with the least means; A scenario that embodies the related ideals of ecological 
modernity and ‘just sustainability’. As more cities begin to adopt sustainable living principles, 
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the existence of quality green affordable housing will become an indicator of what regions are 
serious about integrating decarbonization strategies as a way of life for everyone. 
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APPENDIX A - Ontario households recognized as low-income by the Ontario 
Electricity Support Program and for the purposes of this paper. 
 
 
Level of   Number of people living in home    
Household 1 2  3 4  5  6 7  
Income ($)            
28,000 or ✔ ✔  ✔ ✔  ✔  ✔ ✔  
less            
28,001-    ✔ ✔  ✔  ✔ ✔  
39,000            
39,001-       ✔  ✔ ✔  
48,000            
48,000-          ✔  
52,000            
      Source: Ontario Energy Board, 2016 
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APPENDIX B – Non-Energy Benefits identified by Navigant Consulting 
 
Beneficiary Non-Energy Benefit  
Utility 
Reduced carrying cost on arrearages  
(interest)*    
Utility Lower bad debt written off*  
Utility Fewer shutoffs*  
Utility Fewer reconnects*  
Utility Fewer notices*  
Utility Fewer customer calls*  
Utility Lower collection costs*  
Utility Reduction in emergency gas service calls  
Utility 
Utility health and safety - insurance savings  
only    
Utility 
Transmission and/or distribution savings  
(distribution only)    
Utility 
Utility rate subsidy avoided (CARE)  
payments*    
Societal 
Economic impact (direct and indirect  
employment)**    
Societal Emissions/environmental**  
Societal 
Health and safety equipment (CO and Other  
health and safety)    
Societal Water and wastewater (avoided)  
Participant Water/sewer savings  
Participant Fewer shutoffs*  
Participant Fewer calls to the utility*  
Participant Fewer reconnects*  
Participant Property value benefits*  
Participant Fewer fires  
Participant Indoor air quality (CO-related)  
Participant Moving costs/mobility*  
Participant 
Fewer illnesses and lost days from  
work/school    
Participant 
Reduced transactions costs (limited  
measures)    
Participant Net household benefits from comfort, noise  
Participant 
Net household benefits from additional  
hardship benefits*    
 Source: Navigant Consulting Inc., 2015a  
*Indicates NEBs that apply to low‐income solar PV programs. 
 
**Indicates NEBs that could apply to low‐income solar PV programs but were not considered in this analysis because the LIPPT report 
conservatively estimated the value to be zero in order to avoid double counting with other avoided cost values. 
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